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Does It Matter How We Assess Standard of Living? Evidence from Indian Slums 
Comparing Monetary and Multidimensional Approaches*  
Sugata Bag and Suman SethÁ  
 
Abstract 
As part of Sustainable Development Goals, the United Nations have set targets of upgrading slums 
and reducing poverty in all its dimensions by 2030. Policies towards improving the living 
conditions of slum-dwellers require proper assessment of their standard of living as well as 
understanding the associated characteristics. In this paper, using slum-level primary household 
survey data from three largest Indian cities, we, first, assess the standard of living of slum dwellers 
using both monetary and non-monetary approaches and then explore how various household and 
spatial characteristics are consistently or differently associated with both forms of assessments. 
We use standard monetary indicators, but to assess non-monetary standard of living, use a counting 
approach framework and justify the selection of specific indicators in the context of slums. Our 
analysis yields some interesting observations as some characteristics are differently associated 
with monetary and non-monetary living standards, which should affect policy designs in slums. 
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1 Introduction 
According to United Nations (2015, Table II.8), the global population has increased by 2.9 times 
between 1950 and 2014 and the population is expected to increase by 3.8 times in a century 
between 1950 and 2050. This increase however has certainly not been and is not expected to be 
uniform across rural and urban areas. While the global rural population has increased by 1.9 times 
between 1950 and 2014 (and is only expected to increase by 1.8 times between 1950 and 2050), 
the urban population has multiplied by 5.2 times between 1950 and 2014 and is projected to 
multiply by a massive 8.5 times in a century since 1950. Three geographic regions that are expected 
to contribute to this enormous increase are Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, 
mostly low- and middle-income developing countries, where the urban population is projected to 
increase by 41.8 times, 13.5 times, and 9.8 times, respectively, between 1950 and 2050.  
The traditional view on the existence of slums argues that slums are inevitable during the process 
of modernisation, industrialisation, and urbanisation (Frankenhoff 1967; Turner 1969). This 
traditional view hinges on the assumptions that slum settlements grow to accommodate cheap 
labour migrants providing cheap housing, but economic growth should eventually trickle down to 
those living in slums. The trickle-down effect however has been questioned as some regions 
experienced decades of urbanization without growth (Fay and Opal, 2000; Fox, 2012), witnessed 
low degrees of intergenerational socioeconomic mobility among slum dwellers (Buckley and 
Kalarickal, 2005) and faced rising cost of slum accommodation (Gulyani and Talukdar, 2008). 
Questioning the traditional view, Fox (2014) puts forward a disjointed modernization hypothesis, 
which argues the reason for perpetual existence of slums is that µXUEDQSRSXODWLRQJURZWKRXWSDFHV
XUEDQHFRQRPLFDQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQW¶ as well as infrastructures in these regions.  
Whichever hypothesis is true regarding the existence of slums, between 1990 and 2012, the 
number of slum dwellers in these three regions increased from 650 million to 862 million (UN-
HABITAT 2003). Slums within urban areas are considered either DV ³EOLJKW´ of erstwhile 
prosperous area RUDV³VWDJLQJDUHDV´ for immigrant poor (Frankenhoff, 1967) having distinct and 
derogatory characteristics, such as worse levels of education, health and other socio-economic 
indicators, compared to the rest of the urban areas (Martinez et al., 2008; Banerjee et al., 2012; 
Fink et al., 2014). It is to be noted that although slums are differentiated from non-slum areas by 
certain common characteristics, yet there exist large inter-city and intra-city differences (Bag et 
al., 20162¶+DUHet al., 1998).  
As the phenomenal surge in slum population is identified as a major challenge for the overall urban 
development, policies towards improving the lives of slum inhabitants has not been overlooked. It 
has rather been a crucial part of the global development agenda over the past few decades. To 
µDFKLHYHDVLJQLILFDQWLPSURYHPHQWLQWKHOLYHVRIDWOHDVWPLOOLRQVOXPGZHOOHUVE\¶KDG
been an important target within the seventh Millennium Development Goal (MDG). The newly-
revised first target of the eleventh Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) SURSRVHV WR µHQVXUH
access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrade slums by 
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¶1 Needless to say, the appropriate policy design is essential to improve the standard of living 
(SoL hereafter) within slums, but there is still a substantial gap in policy choice (Marx et al., 2013). 
The policy choice can be strengthened through an appropriate understanding of the type of 
adversities the slum inhabitants encounter as well as comprehending the correlates of their 
adversities. 
In order to explore the SoL of slum-dwellers, in this paper, we have chosen the three most populous 
cities in India with largest concentration of slum population and the history of colonial rule: 
Mumbai, Delhi, and Kolkata.2 Although our focus remain on three Indian cities, our analysis and 
understanding may act as a valuable lesson for other developing countries. In this paper, we use a 
primary household survey dataset as the existing national surveys are not appropriate for obtaining 
information about slum dwellers (Carr-Hill 2013; Agarawal, 2011). We assess the SoL of slum 
dwellers by the widely prevalent monetary approach as well as by a complementary non-monetary 
counting approach framework (Atkinson, 2003; Alkire and Foster, 2011) ZKHUHHDFKKRXVHKROG¶V
SoL is assessed by counting the number of non-monetary deprivations (referred as deprivation 
score) suffered by the household.3 We justify the selection of indicators used in the counting 
framework that are especially crucial in capturing the SoL of slum dwellers.  
Our findings reveal that the slum dwellers in Mumbai enjoy a better SoL than those in Kolkata and 
Delhi in terms of both monetary and non-monetary indicators. Although monetary indicators do 
not reveal any difference in the SoL between the slum dwellers of Kolkata and Delhi, the slum 
dwellers in Kolkata suffer a larger number of simultaneous non-monetary deprivations than those 
in Delhi. 
We further explore which of the slum-level and the household-level characteristics are associated 
with lower monetary and non-monetary SoL within the slums of each city. In order to explore this 
question, we resort to multivariate regression analyses. We observe that not only certain 
characteristics are differently associated with the monetary and the non-monetary SoL across 
cities, but also they are quite differently associated with monetary vis-à-vis non-monetary SoL 
within cities. The household characteristics that are found to be consistently associated with lower 
per-capita household income across slums of all three cities are female heads, larger household 
sizes, higher child dependence, and not having at least one member who is either a government 
employee/pensioner or have a private contractual job. Similarly, the households that are observed 
to suffer lower non-monetary SoL in slums of all three cities are households with higher child 
                                                 
1
 The information has been accessed in April 2016 at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgsproposal.html. 
2
 According to the 2011 Census, the total population and the proportion of slum population of Mumbai, Delhi and 
Kolkata were 12.5 million and 52%, 11 million and 15.5%, and 4.5 million and 32%, respectively. See Bag et al. 
(2016) for further discussions aERXWWKHVHVOXPV¶FRORQLDOKLVWRU\ 
3
 The need for looking at indicators beyond income to understand and assess living standards has been widely 
discussed. See, for instance, Stiglitz et al. (2009) and in the Indian context Swaminathan (1995). Whether we should 
combine monetary and non-monetary indicators into a single SoL measure, is a subject of debate. In this paper, we 
are interested in comparing monetary SoL with non-monetary SoL and thus we do not pursue that route. For a novel 
effort to integrate monetary and non-monetary indicators into a single multidimensional measure, see Santos and 
Villatoro (2017).  
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dependence, indigenous households (Scheduled Caste (SC) or Scheduled Tribe (ST)) without any 
caste reservation certificate, and households not having at least one member who is either a 
government employee/pensioner or have a private contractual job.  
Furthermore, we H[DPLQH WKH81¶VQRWLRQRI LPSURYLQJ WKH6R/RI WKHVOXP-dwellers through 
conferring a secured tenure in Mumbai. Although we observe that the households in slums that are 
legally protected from eviction earn higher incomes compared to those in non-protected slums, yet 
the former households are non-monetarily indifferent to the latter households. This observation 
questions WKH 81¶V prevailing notion of improving living standards in slums through tenure 
security. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section outlines the broad classification 
of slums in the three cities, the sampling frame and our survey data collection process. The third 
section presents the diversified characteristics of the slums in three cities as well as that of their 
inhabitants. The fourth section outlines how we assess the monetary and non-monetary SoLs and 
compare across three cities. The fifth section analyses how the characteristics discussed in section 
three are associated with slum-KRXVHKROGV¶6R/ through multivariate regressions. The sixth section 
concludes. 
2 Slum Types, Sampling Frame and Data Collection 
UN-HABITAT (2003) defines a slum household as a group of individuals living under the same 
roof, who are lacking any of the five criteria: (i) access to improved water, (ii) access to improved 
sanitation facilities, (iii) sufficient-living area, (iv) durable dwellings structure, and (v) secured 
tenure. This definition is however highly generalised and should be reviewed and broadened in the 
context of any particular country. In fact, the three metro-cities of India under study house some 
of the oldest slum settlements tracing back to the colonial period. We first elaborate the slum 
typology in these cities and then present how the typology has influenced our sampling design for 
primary survey. 
2.1 Slum typology 
,QWKH,QGLDQFRQWH[WWKHWHUPµVOXP¶ORRVHO\DSSOLHVWRWZRGLVWLQFWVHWWOHPHQWW\SHV tenement 
settlement and squatter settlement.4 Tenement settlements were mostly created during the colonial 
phase by local landlords or the factory owners to provide shelters to migrant workers on the basis 
of a long-term lease agreement. However, squatter settlements mainly came into existence in the 
post-colonial phase and are illegally occupied clusters of quasi-permanent habitation along canals, 
railway tracts, or roads or on previously vacant degraded lands (i.e. staging area). 
Since the mid-ninetieth century in the colonial phase, both Mumbai and Kolkata observed a spurt 
of large-scale industrialization and urbanization sustained by a large number of migrant labourers. 
                                                 
4
 Locally, a tenement housing settlement is referred to as Basti in Kolkata, Chawl in Mumbai, and Katra in Old Delhi; 
whereas a squatter settlement is referred to as Jhupri in Kolkata, Zopadpatti in Mumbai, and Jhuggi Jhopri in Delhi. 
For related discussion on types of slums VHH5LVEXGSSDQG2¶+DUHet al. 1998, pp. 270. 
     
 
5 
The lack of spatial immobility of these migrants for various reasons led to a unique tenurial 
structure, resulting in tenement settlements. Tenants were either rented out lands for constructing 
their own shanties or were directly rented out quasi-permanent shanties on a long term lease, 
usually with an upfront payment and a small rent. These lease agreements were known as thika in 
Kolkata and pagri in Mumbai. Similar pattern emerged in the Old City of Delhi during the colonial 
SKDVHGXHWRWKHFLW\¶VKLVWRULFDOWUDQVIRUPDWLRQSURFHVVOLQNHGWRWKHFRQYHUVLRQRIROGPDQVLRQV
to accommodate existing workers and migrants labourers engaged in the construction of the capital 
city of New Delhi. In the post-colonial phase, this type of tenancy system was adopted by many 
house owners even in squatter settlement areas. 
In the post-colonial phase, various acts and bills were passed towards protecting the shelter rights 
RI WKH WHQHPHQW VHWWOHPHQWV¶ UHVLGHQWV ZKLFK Kowever prevented their further proliferation.5 
Especially in Kolkata, an overwhelming majority of present slums are on the lands under thika act 
of 1981 and are directly under the purview of the local municipal corporation. Tenement 
settlements in Kolkata DQG0XPEDLZKLFKDUHTXLWHRUJDQL]HGDUH LQWHJUDOSDUWVRI WKHFLWLHV¶
legitimate housing stocks. Although the tenure security of the tenants remained protected, 
tenement settlements in Kolkata and Mumbai face various challenges. Presently, most tenement 
settlements are under city-specific rent control acts with the aim of freezing the rents at predated 
times. Moreover, various court rulings and legislations impose status quo over carrying out further 
developments on existing structures, adversely affecting private investments on already 
dilapidated structures and property tax collections.  
As the tenement settlements were prevented to proliferate in the post-colonial phase, two distinct 
factors ± the deluge of migrant labourers linked to contemporaneously growing industrial bases 
and spill over from existing tenement settlements due to natural population growth ± have caused 
a rapid increase in squatter settlements mostly through illegal occupation. Besides, Kolkata and 
Delhi have faced a deluge of refugee migrants, who kept squatting for a long time before settling 
into refugee ghettoes.  
From the legal viewpoint, under the Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act (1956) of India, 
squatter settlements are primarily classified into two categories: registered and unregistered. This 
typology is important as each has implications in terms of entitlements to basic services. Registered 
squatter settlements are declared as slums by the local authorities and thus their dwellers deserve 
basic shelter requirements with some form of tenure security and access to certain civic facilities. 
                                                 
5
 The Slum Area Improvement and Clearance Act of India (a Union Act) was brought in 1956 (accessed in April 2017; 
web: http://lawmin.nic.in/ld/P-ACT/1956/A1956-96.pdf). In Kolkata, the first Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act was 
brought in 1949, the Calcutta Slum Clearance Bill was proposed in 1957 offering subsidized flats to evictees, and the 
Calcutta Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Bill was brought in 1981 to enhance the protection status further 
by enabling provision of basic amenities to the dwellers. In Mumbai, the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, 
Clearance and Redevelopment) Act was passed in 1971, by which most tenements housing settlement constructed 
before 1956 were censused and declared as slums. In Delhi, the Union Act of 1956 declared the Old City areas as slum 
designated area, but by a recent order in 2004 these areas were de-notified to be slums ceasing tenement settlements 
in this area to be legally recognised as slum.  
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Unregistered squatter settlements are however considered illegal and their dwellers are bereft of 
any entitlement to basic civic services and are under constant threat of eviction.6 
In both type of slum-settlements, possessions of houses are classified into two main categories ± 
owned houses and rented tenancy, where rented tenancy is sub-categorised into thika/pagri 
tenancy, informal tenancy (oral/unspecified tenure) and other tenancies, such as short-lease, shared 
etc.  
2.2 Sampling frame and data collection 
We have collected the primary household survey data in 2013-14 through two-stage stratified 
sampling from the slums of the municipal corporation areas of Kolkata, Mumbai and Delhi as part 
of the EuropeaQ8QLRQIXQGHGJOREDOUHVHDUFKSURMHFW³123225´ The reason for conducting a 
primary survey rather than using the existing secondary national household surveys (e.g., National 
Sample Surveys (NSS) and Indian Human Development Surveys (IHDS)) is that they do not have 
any slum identifier. Although National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) contain slum identifiers, 
they do not collect any information on monetary indicators. Moreover, Agarawal (2011) and Carr-
Hill (2013) correctly point out that the nationally representative household surveys are not 
appropriate for obtaining information about slum populations and other disjoint populations.  
Our survey collects individual level as well as household level information in greater details 
compared to what is collected in census and other nationally representative household surveys, 
such as National Sample Surveys and Demographic Health Surveys. For designing our survey, we 
relied on various slum-level information that are either available in the public domain or acquired 
through different government agencies. For Kolkata, we acquired the slum level information 
VOXPFOXVWHUVDFURVVRIZDUGVKRXVLQJ WKRXVDQGKRXVHKROGVIURPµ%XVWHH
GDWD¶FRPSLOHGE\WKH.RONDWD0XQLFLSDO&RUSRUDWLRQ.0&LQ0DUFK For Mumbai, we 
used the ward-wise population distribution from the 2009 Mumbai Human Development Report 
(Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 2010), which used the 2001 Indian Census as their 
basis. For Delhi, we used the list of squatter (Jhuggi Jhopri) clusters available from the Delhi 
Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB). 
In the first stage of the survey, within each city, the municipal corporation areas were stratified 
according to the largest possible administrative divisions: at the borough level in Kolkata, at the 
ward level in Mumbai and at the revenue-district level in Delhi. The number of households to be 
interviewed from each stratum was determined through proportional sampling, but with the 
additional requirement that at least thirty households should be interviewed from each stratum.7 In 
                                                 
6
 According to the local municipal corporation data of 2001, nearly 63% of all slum clusters in Mumbai were protected 
from eviction threats. The Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) Act (Delhi Act 07 of 2010) although 
recognizes most of the squatter settlements (and maintains a list of Jhuggi Jhopri Cluster settlements), it does not 
necessarily confer any protection from eviction.  
7
 It is worth noting that pavement dwellers are treated differently from slum dwellers by most civic authorities, census 
and national surveys. While DUSIB maintains a list of daily attendees at various night shelters, it does not provide 
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the second stage of the survey, a number of slums were randomly selected from each stratum and 
then from each selected slum, a collection of households were randomly selected to be interviewed.  
Our decision on the sample size to be collected from each city was based on the total slum 
population size of the city as well as on the degree to which regional or other subsamples 
representations were required. In Kolkata, from 15 boroughs we randomly selected 63 slums from 
which we interviewed 808 households. In Mumbai, from 23 wards we randomly selected 77 slums 
and interviewed 1,086 households, (Ward C in Mumbai does not have any slum). In Delhi, from 
11 revenue districts we randomly selected 57 squatter settlements and interviewed 864 households.  
We have tried our best to ensure that our sample represents the slum types and land-ownership 
types of slums. The collected samples in Kolkata and Mumbai include both tenement and squatter 
settlements. In Mumbai, according to the local municipal corporation data of 2001, of the 1997 
slum clusters in 23 of 24 wards, 53.7% were on government lands (of which 42% were protected 
and 17% are notified) and 43.3% were on private lands (of which only 14% were protected and 
54% were notified).8 Unfortunately, WKHµ%XVWHHGDWD¶RI.RONDWDGLGQRWKDYHVXFKLQIRUPDWLRQ. 
In Delhi, our sample also represents different land-owning agency. According to the 2013 database 
of DUSIB, 685 slum clusters were spread across 11 revenue districts housing about 400 thousand 
households and 95% of these clusters were on government or its agency lands.9 However, due to 
the unavailability of information about the type of possession of houses in the public domain, we 
had to rely solely on intervieZHHV¶UHVSRQVHVLQRXUVXUYH\10   
We draw the design of the survey questionnaire from the latest round of National Sample Survey 
(NSS) household questionnaire and slum particulars, and customized to incorporate additional 
variables capturing further characteristics intrinsic to slums. Our questionnaire captures 
information both at the household and the individual levels. At the household level, we collected 
information on religion, caste, various public-assistance-card holding statuses, type of housing, 
access to basic facilities, access to government schemes, assets, land and house ownership details 
and related incomes, consumption and expenditure details on basic food items. At the individual 
level, we collected information on age, gender, marital status, age at marriage, literacy and 
                                                 
any data on pavement dwellers. Ironically, civic bodies of Kolkata and Mumbai fail on both counts. Our survey does 
not collect data on pavement dwellers. 
8
 The Maharashtra Slum Areas Act 1971 classified registered squatter settlements into two further categories: 
protected and notified (web: http://www.sra.gov.in/data/Maharashtra_Slum_Areas_Improvement_Clearance.pdf; 
accessed in April 2017). The Slum Rehabilitation Act (1995), passed by the state government to promote the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIVOXPDUHDVDQGWRSURWHFWVOXPGZHOOHUV¶ULJKWVSURWHFWVDQ\RQHIURPHYLFWLRQZKRFRXOGSURGXFHD
city-residency status document prior to January 1995, regardless of previously living in that slum. Dwellers in notified 
slums only deserve basic shelter requirements. 
9
 In Delhi, we interviewed households from Resettlement and Relocation colonies and in Mumbai we interviewed 
households residing in resettlement lands (during 1970s) and in buildings constructed by the Slum rehabilitation 
authority (SRA) since 1995. Studying these households is out of the scope for this paper. For further details on the 
sampling design and the entire sample collection process, see Bag et al. (2016). 
10
 We acknowledge that many pagri tenants in Mumbai may appear to claim the ownership of the house, perhaps due 
to the prospect of getting a house under resettlement schemes. 
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educational details, migration details, employment details including information of earning and 
past occupations, savings and insurance details, and some health-related information.  
3 Diversified characteristics of slums and their dwellers 
$OWKRXJKWKHWHUPµVOXP¶JHQHUDOO\UHIOHFWVXSRQDFRQJHVWHGKDELWDWLRQSDWWHUQRIWKHSRRUSHRSOH
being inflicted with suboptimal infrastructures, insufficient facilities, derogatory living conditions 
and being marginalized by various socio-economic forces, but by no means slums are 
homogeneous throughout. Their heterogeneities emanate from their historical genesis, location 
specificity, or even from their legal affiliation or protection status as discussed Section 2. 
Moreover, slum-dwellers vary widely by their migration pattern, type of tenancy, and ethnic as 
well as demographic backgrounds both across and within slums.11 In this section, we present some 
descriptive statistics that capture the diverse nature of slum dwelling households across three cities. 
It follows from our discussion in Section 2 that the historical pattern of migration in Kolkata and 
Mumbai are somewhat similar, but Delhi follows a different path. Figure 1 presents the decadal 
migration pattern in the past century of all surveyed households using their response to the survey 
question: When did the household move to the city including its previous generation? We observe 
that Kolkata witnesses a relatively larger pre-independence influx of migrants than Mumbai; 
whereas Delhi witnesses a relatively larger post-independence influx than both.  
Figure 1: Decadal Migration Pattern of Surveyed Households in Three Cities 
  
 
The migration of labourers and the process of slummification primed during 1940-60 in Kolkata 
and during 1970-80 in Mumbai; both of these are closely linked to respective industrialization 
peak period in the two cities.12 Delhi however observed the major spurt roughly during 1980s, 
                                                 
11
 For a detailed discussion of historical migration pattern please refer to Bag et al. (2016). 
12
 .RONDWD¶VIRUWXQHFKDQJHGGUDPDWLFDOO\ZLWKWKHVKLIWRIFDSLWDOWR1HZ'HOKLLQDQGZLWKSDUWLWLRQLQ
once thriving industries started to stagnate in post-independence era. However, Kolkata registered a large influx of 
refugee migration twice: around 1950 due to the partition and during 1970s due to civil conflict in Bangladesh. In 
Mumbai, World War II introduced a number of incentive schemes for industrial expansion coupled with the 
diversification of the manufacturing sector and the construction of the port in late 1950s.  
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9 
which incidentally coincided with the establishment of industrial areas in Okhla and Rohini and a 
phase of break in the slum eviction and rehabilitation process.13 Consequently, the share of 
migration has slowed down at the dawn of the new millennium in these cities. Of the migrated 
households, 65-80% of household heads migrated to the slums of cities in the 30-year period 
between 1970 and 2000. This diversity in migration pattern is captured E\WKHKRXVHKROGKHDG¶V
migration status presented in Panel I of Table 1. Around three-fifth of households in Kolkata and 
around two-fifth of households in Mumbai reported the head to be born in the city. The same for 
Delhi reads less than a fifth.  
Irrespective of whether the heads were born or migrated, slums in Kolkata, Mumbai and Delhi 
comprise population from diverse ethnic, lingual and provincial background. Panel II of Table 1 
captures the heterogeneity in the geographical origins of the household heads. We categorise India 
into six geographical regions: North-Central, North-Western, Central, Western, Southern, and 
Eastern.14 The first noteworthy observation is that majority of households within any city are either 
from the native state (except in Delhi) or from North-Central region of India. An overwhelming 
three quarters of households in Delhi are from the North-&HQWUDO VWDWHV GXH WR 'HOKL¶V FORVH
proximity to these states. Although Mumbai is far from these states, it still manages to attract 
migrants from North-Central states owing to the job opportunity it creates. Worth noticing that 
Kolkata slums are also home to a significant fraction of migrant-heads (8.7%) who trace their root 
back to places outside of India especially from Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) owing to 
refugee migration because of the partition of the country during independence and again during 
the civil war in Bangladesh reflecting our discussions in Section 2.  
We next look at tenancy types in Panel III, linking again to our discussions in Section 2. We find 
the tenancy types to differ significantly across cities. In Delhi and Mumbai, around 87% and 73% 
of households report residing in owned houses, respectively; whereas in Kolkata only 37.9% report 
residing in owned houses and 62% report occupying rented houses (37.5% are in thika tenancy). 
Residing in owned houses, however, does not transpire to legally secured tenure if the houses are 
built on encroached public land or lands owned by private entities but not by the slum-dwellers 
themselves.15 
In the next four panels of Table 1, we present additional demographic characteristics, such as 
KRXVHKROG KHDGV¶ JHQGHU KRXVHKROGV¶ FRPSRVLWLRQ DQG KRXVHKROGV¶ UHOLJLRQ DQG FDVWH
affiliations. The share of female-headed households is less than a fifth of all households in slums 
                                                 
13
 Between 1960 and 1970, Delhi witnessed a substantial drive to evict squatter settlements as well as rehabilitate them 
into Resettlement colonies. After a break of close to two decades, the rehabilitation programme was resumed in late 
1990s. 
14
 The six geographical regions consist of the following states. North-Central: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand and 
Uttarakhand; North-Western: Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Delhi; 
Central: Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh; Western: Maharashtra, Gujarat, Goa, and Daman-Diu; Southern: Tamil Nadu, 
Kerala, Karnataka, Andhra and Telengana; Eastern: West Bengal and Orissa. The native state of Kolkata, Mumbai 
and Delhi are West Bengal, Maharashtra and Delhi itself, respectively. 
15
 2XUVXUYH\GDWDVKRZWKDWRYHURI'HOKL¶VVTXDWWHUVDUHRQSXEOLFODQGDQGLQ0XPEDLDERXWKDOIRIDOOKRXVHV
are on public land, 5% are on private land, and 45% are on land of unknown status. 
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of every cLW\/RRNLQJDWKRXVHKROGV¶FRPSRVLWLRQVLQ3DQHO9RIWKHWDEOHZHREVHUYHWKDWWKH
average household sizes in slums of Mumbai and Kolkata are statistically significantly lower than 
that in the slums of Delhi. This larger household size in slums of Delhi is a resultant of the presence 
of larger number of younger dependents, which is consistent with the larger share of migration in 
recent decades. Caste and religion compositions are also quite different in slums across cities. 
More than 90% household heads in all cities have identified themselves as either Hindu or Muslim; 
people from other religions are truly in minority in slums. However, the composition between 
these two dominant religious communities varies starkly. The share of Muslim households is 
higKHVW LQ .RONDWD  DQG ORZHVW LQ 'HOKL¶V -- FRORQLHV  /RRNLQJ DW WKH FDVWH
composition (self-reported), we find that over half of the households in Delhi identified themselves 
as scheduled castes. The shares of scheduled caste in other two cities are in the range of 20-26%. 
The shares of households identifying themselves as other backward classes in slums of Delhi and 
Mumbai stand at more than a fifth, but the same is quite low in Kolkata.16 
,QWKHILQDOWZRSDQHOVZHSUHVHQWKRXVHKROGV¶SXEOLF distribution system card holding status and 
their job security status. If a household holds any types of public distribution card such as the 
below poverty line card, Annapurna card or Antyodaya card, the household is entitled to certain 
public benefits. The households entitled for BPL+ cards are identified using various identifiers 
such as low income, lack of certain assets etc. For a discussion on the evolution of the BPL 
identification criteria of the Indian government, see Alkire and Seth (2013a). Households that are 
categorized as above poverty line (APL) or households that do not hold such cards are not entitled 
to receive these social benefits. We refer to these types of cards as BPL+ cards. It should be noted 
that of the surveyed households in Kolkata only 7% hold BPL+ cards, 84% are APL and 8.7% 
have no card. The picture is slightly different in Mumbai, where 21% households hold BPL+ card, 
70% are APL and 9.1% have no card. In Delhi, however, 49% households hold BPL+ cards and 
only 19% are APL, yet 32% have no card. 
The final panel of the table presents the figures showing the job security of the households. Most 
slum dwellers are employed in the informal sector, where jobs cannot be considered secured. In 
Delhi slums, more than 80% of surveyed households do not have any member who is either 
employed in a government job or is a regular pensioner or has any kind of private contractual job. 
The equivalent figures are around 70% in Kolkata and more than half in Mumbai slums. 
                                                 
16
 7KHFDVWHFRPSRVLWLRQLVFUHDWHGLUUHVSHFWLYHRIWKHKRXVHKROGKHDG¶VUHOLJLRXVDIILOLDWLRQ)RUH[DPSOHDQ2%&RU
SC/ST) family could have their religious belief in Hinduism, Islam or any other faith. It should be noted that these 
scheduled categories are constitutionally mandated categories that are entitled for affirmative action. However, 
benefits of affirmative action can be availed provided the appropriate state authorities have issued a caste certificate 
to the individuals. We have noticed two issues while interviewing households belonging to non-general caste 
categories: (a) many households do not have caste certificates despite belonging to scheduled sub-castes (44-52% for 
SC/STs, 57-72% for OBCs); (b) many households preferred to represent themselves belonging to the general caste 
category either because they were not able to get respective caste certificates from their place of origin or because 
they found it embarrassing to reveal their true caste category.  
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Table 1: Household Characteristics in Slums of Kolkata, Mumbai and Delhi 
    Kolkata  Mumbai  Delhi 
I. Household head's migration status       
Migrated to the city  37.4%  62.0%  83.6% 
Born in the city  62.6%  38.0%  16.4% 
,,+RXVHKROG¶VUHJLRQRIorigin in India        
Native state  33.1%  42.0%  2.3% 
North-Central states  56.0%  29.1%  73.8% 
North-Western states  0.6%  3.7%  11.8% 
Central states  -  0.4%  4.6% 
Eastern states  0.9%  1.6%  1.9% 
Western states  0.1%  9.3%  2.3% 
Southern states  0.7%  13.5%  1.9% 
Foreign (outside of India)   8.7%  0.3%  1.3% 
,,,+RXVHKROG¶VW\SHRIWHQDQF\       
 Own house  37.9%  72.7%  87.1% 
 Rented tenancy (Thika/Pagri)  37.5%  8.7%  1.4% 
 Informal tenancy  16.0%  7.9%  8.5% 
 Other form of tenancy  8.5%  10.1%  2.5% 
IV. Female headed household  19.7%  19.5%  14.0% 
V. Composition of household       
Average household size  5.06  4.89  5.46 
+RXVHKROGZLWKGHSHQGHQWV\HDUV	\HDUV  25.1%  24.2%  29.1% 
«+RXVHKROGZLWKHOGHUO\GHSHQGHQWV\HDUV  4.9%  4.6%  1.8% 
«+RXVHKROGZLWK\RXQJGHSHQGHQWV\HDUV   20.2%  19.6%  27.3% 
VI. +RXVHKROGKHDG¶VUHOLJLRQ       
Hindu  65.7%  69.3%  83.5% 
Muslim  31.5%  21.4%  15.4% 
Christian  2.5%  2.4%  0.5% 
Sikh  0.0%  0.1%  0.4% 
Other  0.2%  6.8%  0.2% 
9,,+RXVHKROGKHDG¶VFDVWH*       
Scheduled caste (SC)  25.7%  19.9%  53.4% 
Scheduled tribe (ST)  0.5%  1.8%  2.4% 
Other backward class (OBC)  9.4%  24.5%  22.2% 
General & undisclosed  64.5%  53.9%  22.0% 
9,,,+RXVHKROG¶V3'6FDUGKROGLQJVWDWXV       
Below poverty line, Annapurna and Antyodaya (BPL+)  7.1%  21.2%  49.1% 
Above poverty line (APL)  84.3%  69.7%  18.8% 
No card  8.7%  9.1%  32.1% 
,;+RXVHKROG¶VMREVHFXULW\VWDWXV       
At least one government employee or regular pensioner  10.7%  11.8%  6.1% 
At least one person with a private job contract  21.0%  34.3%  8.4% 
All working members have informal employment  68.3%  53.9%  85.6% 
Sample size  808  1085  868 
6RXUFH$XWKRUV¶RZQFRPSXWDWLRQV 
* - See footnote 16 for relevant discussion. 
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4 Assessing standard of living in slums 
There are various competing approaches for gauging the standard of living (SoL, hereafter) of any 
population. It may be reflected either by looking at the well-being of the population or through 
their deprivations. Typically, the SoL of a household is assessed by different monetary indicators, 
which are either the maximum possible per-capita monetary resources that can be spent without 
depleting the assets held (income) or by the per-capita consumption of goods and services valued 
at current prices, regardless of whether an actual transaction had taken place (consumption 
expenditure). Monetary approaches are resource-based methods and are criticized conceptually on 
WKHJURXQG WKDW WKH\PD\ QRWQHFHVVDULO\ FDSWXUH WKHKRXVHKROGV¶ FDSDELOLWLHV WR WUDQVIRUP WKH
resources into their well-being (Sen 1999). Additionally, the improvements in monetary indicators 
in practice do not necessarily appear to go hand in hand with the improvements in their non-
monetary counterparts (Bourguignon et al. 2010, Whelan et at. 2004, (Ruggieri-Laderchi et al. 
2003). In this section, thus we aim to capture the SoL of slum dwellers through both monetary and 
non-PRQHWDU\DSSURDFKHV,QWKHPRQHWDU\DSSURDFKZHORRNLQWRKRXVHKROGV¶SHU-capita incomes 
and per-capita consumption expenditures; whereas, our non-monetary analysis is based on a 
counting approach framework (Atkinson, 2003; Alkire and Foster, 2011). The two main benefits 
of using a counting framework are: to respect the ordinal nature of the non-monetary variables 
and to capture the joint distribution of dimensions because one non-monetary dimension may not 
necessarily proxy for other important non-monetary dimensions. 
4.1 Monetary standard of living 
2XU VXUYH\ TXHVWLRQQDLUH FRQWDLQV D PRGXOH RQ KRXVHKROGV¶ GLIIHUHQW VRXUFHV RI VHOI-reported 
income as well as a brief module on houseKROGV¶ VHOI-reported expenditures on major items 
consumed.17 The income module contains information on wage earnings, inward remittances and 
rents received from property ownerships. The expenditure module includes information on 
consumption and expenses incurred on major food items (such as groceries, major vegetable and 
non-YHJHWDEOHLWHPVFRRNLQJIXHOV LQWR[LFDQWVVWXGHQWV¶HGXFDWLRQIHHVDQGFRQYH\DQFHFRVW
rent payments, electricity bills, and outward remittances.18 Our survey procedure ensures that the 
collected income and the consumption expenditure data are comparable across cities, but our 
results may not be strictly comparable with other major national surveys.19  
                                                 
17
 Income data were reported for 98.5% of households in Kolkata and 99.7% of households in Mumbai and Delhi. 
Income data are difficult to collect, and are likely to be subject to error (possibility of both over- and under- reporting). 
The figures from these surveys can be considered approximations of incomes earned by households in the month prior 
to the survey. 
18
 Total expenditure of households does not include the cost of clothing, water, and sanitation, the transport cost for 
the employed persons, cost of Cable TV connection, Mobile and Internet recharges, cost of treatment for illness and 
chronic diseases, and the expenditure on food consumed outside of the house. 
19
 To ensure comparability of monetary aggregates across cities and across the duration of the survey, incomes and 
expenditures have been adjusted for price differences using consumer price indices obtained from 
http://labourbureau.nic.in/indtab.html'HOKL¶VSULFHLQGH[IRU2FWREHUWKHILQDOPRQWKDQGFLW\RIRXUVXUYH\
has been used as the base price. 
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In four panels of Figure 2, we present the empirical cumulative distribution functions (CDF) for 
four different monetary indicators and in Table 2 we present their monthly averages and standard 
errors. The four monetary indicators we look at are: (i) per-capita total income consisting wage 
earnings, rent incomes and inward remittances, (ii) per-capita labour income consisting of only 
wage earnings of all household members, (iii) per-capita total expenditure consisting expenses on 
IRRG LWHPVFRRNLQJ IXHOV LQWR[LFDQWV VWXGHQWV¶ IHHVDQG WUDQVSRUWFRVWV UHQWVSDLG HOHFWULFLW\
bills, and outward remittances, and (iv) per-capita food-fuel expenditure consisting expenses only 
on food items and cooking fuels. These are CPI adjusted figures (in INR), with November 2014 
Delhi prices for industrial workers as base. 
Figure 2: Cumulative Distributions of Monthly Per-capita Incomes and Expenditures 
  
Panel I Panel II 
  
Panel III Panel IV 
 
How does the slum-GZHOOHUV¶ 6R/ IDUH LQ WHUPV RI PRQHWDU\ LQGLFDWRUV LQ WKUHH FLWLHV" 7KH
cumulative distribution functions provide a significant amount of information. Each horizontal 
axis in Figure 2 presents the per-capita income or expenditure, and each vertical axis presents the 
proportion of slum dwellers. For any income or expenditure threshold, the height of each CDF 
denotes the proportion of slum-dwellers (not the proportion of slum-dwelling households), whose 
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incomes or expenditures is less than that threshold. If the threshold is considered as a poverty line, 
then the height of a CDF provides the proportion of slum dwellers whose income is below the 
poverty line or the incidence of poverty or the poverty headcount-ratio. In this sense, each CDF is 
a poverty incidence curve (Foster and Shorrocks, 1988; Ravallion 1994). If one poverty incidence 
curve always lies to the right of another curve, then the former has lower headcount-ratio than the 
latter for all poverty lines. Alternatively, if one CDF always lies to the right of another CDF, then 
each percentile of the population in the former has higher income or expenditure than that in the 
latter. 
Table 2: Monthly Per-capita Incomes and Expenditures of Slum-dwellers of Three Cities 
Per-capita monetary aggregate  Kolkata Delhi Mumbai 
Total income     2,622.6      2,677.3          3,952.5  (102.9) (55.3) (84.2) 
Wage income     2,539.3      2,638.0          3,849.7  (100.8) (54.5) (82.2) 
Total expenditure     1,624.7      1,633.4          1,992.1  (39.1) (26.4) (34.3) 
Expenditure on food and fuel 1,107.3     1,089.2          1,153.5  (23.9) (15.0) (13.7) 
Source: $XWKRUV¶RZQFRPSXWDWLRQV6WDQGDUGHUURUVDUHUHSRUWHGLQWKHSDUHQWKHVHV 
 
From the first three panels of Figure 2 and from Table 2, we observe that monthly per-capita 
incomes and expenditures are higher among slum dwellers in Mumbai.20 The average per-capita 
total income, per capita labour income and per capita total expenditure in Mumbai slums appear 
to be higher than that in Delhi and Kolkata slums. Delhi and Kolkata slums appear to be 
indiscernible in these three monetary indicators. When we look at per-capita food-fuel expenditure 
in panel IV, slums in all cities appear statistically indistinguishable by their poverty incidence 
curves.21 The reason may be low marginal propensity to food consumption expenditure. The 
bottom-line is that the slum-dwellers in Mumbai enjoy a better SoL based on monetary indicators 
than the slum dwellers in other two cities. 
                                                 
20
 When we refer to higher or lower average, we imply statistically significantly higher or lower at 95% level of 
significance. In order to test whether CDFs are statistically distinguishable, we compute 95% confidence interval for 
each pairwise difference using the Distributive Analysis Stata Package (DASP) (Araar and Duclos 2013). In majority 
of the cases, pairwise differences are not statistically significant throughout the support.  
21
 One may wonder why Mumbai slum dwellers encounter higher non-food expenditure and earn higher income than 
their counterparts in the other two cities. Regarding non-food expenditure, Mumbai slum dwellers incur much higher 
expenditure on house rents, electricity and cooking fuel bills, and outward remittances (refer to Tables 10 and 11 of 
Bag, Seth and Gupta (2016). Regarding income, average education levels among Mumbai slum dwellers are higher 
than in other two cities for every age group, irrespective of gender (Table 15 of Bag et al. 2016). Moreover, Mumbai 
slum dwellers have comparatively much higher participation in formal contractual jobs (30%) yielding significantly 
higher salary than informal jobs (Table 16 of Bag et al. 2016). 
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4.2 Non-monetary standard of living 
Does the non-monetary analysis draw similar conclusions as the ones based on monetary 
indicators?22 Given its multifaceted nature, any one non-monetary indicator may not sufficiently 
capture the slum-GZHOOHUV¶ 6R/ In fact, while studying poverty and deprivation among slum 
dwellers in Mumbai, Swaminathan (1995) proposed understanding poverty through a more 
comprehensive approach rather than focusing merely on their incomes. Unlike monetary 
indicators, most non-monetary indicators are ordinal or categorical, requiring an intuitive and 
meaningful technique to obtain household level SoL aggregates. Among the many available 
multidimensional techniques, we choose to use a counting approach framework (Atkinson, 2003; 
Alkire and Foster, 2011) mainly because the approach has intuitive appeal and it respects the 
ordinal nature of the indicators that we use.23  
Based on the counting approach, we construct a multiple-disadvantage score or deprivation score 
WRFDSWXUHHDFKKRXVHKROG¶V6R/24 A higher deprivation score represents a lower SoL for that 
household. The counting framework involves the following steps (Alkire et al., 2015, Ch 4): (i) 
defining a list of relevant indicators, (ii) assigning a relative weight to each indicator depending 
on its importance relative to other indicators, (iii) defining a deprivation cut-off for each indicator, 
LYFUHDWLQJDELQDU\GHSULYDWLRQVFRUHIRUHDFKKRXVHKROGLQHDFKLQGLFDWRUE\DVVLJQLQJ³´LI
the household is GHSULYHGLQWKDWLQGLFDWRURUE\DVVLJQLQJ³´LIWKHKRXVHKROGLVQRWGHSULYHGY
producing a score for each household by taking a weighted sum of deprivations in list of the 
relevant indicators.  
The assessment of SoL in slums requires defining a list of indicators that are relevant in slum 
settings, and also their deprivation cut-offs.25 The appropriateness of the particular set of 
indicators, the set of deprivation cut-offs and the assigned weights that we choose in this paper to 
construct the non-monetary deprivation score of each household can be questioned and debated. 
However, so would be any other choices. We thus conduct a number of robustness tests of our 
findings with respect to alternative specifications in the next section. We start by considering the 
operational definition of slums according to UN-HABITAT (2003), which defines a slum as an 
                                                 
22
 Mismatches between monetary poverty and non-monetary poverty have been documented in various studies. Across 
nine European countries, Whelan, Layte, and Maître (2004) found mismatches between income poverty and material 
deprivation. Using longitudinal data for Vietnam, Tran, Alkire and Klasen (2015) observed that the overlap between 
income poverty and multidimensional poverty was even less than 50%. For further discussions on relevant studies, 
see Alkire et al. (2015), Ch 1. 
23
 There exist several competing multidimensional approaches, ranging from statistical techniques, such as principal 
component analysis, factor analysis, and structural equation models to the Fuzzy sets approach to numerous axiomatic 
approaches. Most of these approaches either do not distinguish well between cardinal and ordinal variables or may 
not be intuitive for policy purposes. See Chapter 3 of Alkire et al. (2015) for an in-depth discussion on these 
approaches.   
24
 The most well-known application of the counting approach is the global Multidimensional Poverty Index (Alkire 
and Santos, 2010; 2014), which was created with the purpose of cross-country comparisons. This framework however 
has been adopted for poverty assessment at the national and regional level in various countries. For an application of 
the MPI in the Indian context, see Alkire and Seth (2015). 
25
 For an attempt to revise the well-known Multidimensional Poverty Index in the urban context, see Lucci et al. 
(2016). 
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area combining the following characteristics: (i) inadequate access to safe water, (ii) inadequate 
access to sanitation and other infrastructure, (iii) poor structural quality of housing, (iv) 
overcrowding, and (v) insecure residential status. 
The first five indicators in Table 3 are motivated by the first four characteristics of the HN-
HABITAT definition of slums. We identify a household as deprived of water facility LIµWKHZDWHU
source is non-LPSURYHG¶ RU µWLPH WR IHWFK ZDWHU IURP WKH VRXUFH LV  PLQXWHV RU PRUH¶ DQG
DGGLWLRQDOO\µWKH GXUDWLRQRIWKHDFFHVVLVOHVVWKDQWZRKRXUVSHUGD\¶1RWHWKDWLIZHZHUHWR
strictly follow UN definition of water indicator, then only the first qualifier (i.e. unimproved 
source) from our definition remains valid. However, from the inadequacy point of view the 
additional quantifiers also matter a lot. For example, Bag et al. (2016) finds that when this 
µGXUDWLRQRIVRXUFH¶LVVHWDVDQDGGLWLRQDOUHTXLUHPHQWWKHQDIXUWKHUVL[SHUFHQWVOXPKRXVHKROGV
appear to be deprived in Mumbai, who otherwise would have been identified as non-deprived. A 
household is identified as deprived in sanitation facility LIµWKHKRXVHKROGGRHVQRWKDYHDSHUVRQDO
IDFLOLW\¶RUµHYHQLIWKHUHLVDSHUVRQDOIDFLOLW\LWLVVKDUHG¶26 
The third indicator, type of house, and the fourth indictor, leakage in house, are related to poor 
structural quality of housing. It may seem that deprivations in these two indicators are very highly 
correlated. We however find that it is not necessarily the case. In Delhi slums, for example, 30.8 
percent of houses were built with unimproved materials but water was not reported to enter the 
house through roof or wall; whereas 17.2 percent houses were not built with any unimproved 
material but water was still reported to enter the house through roof or wall. It may in fact turn out 
to be a spatial characteristic such as a house being constructed in lowland often gets flooded. The 
fifth indicator, over-crowding, is directly motivated by the fourth criteria of the UN-+$%,7$7¶V
slum definition.27 
Although the first five indicators capture some aspects of SoL within slums in general, the levels 
of deprivation in the same indicator vary across cities as well as the deprivations within the same 
city are widely different across these five indicators. We find the collection of five indicators to be 
insufficient and thus we have decide to include six additional indicators that we argue are important 
in reflecting the deficient living conditions of the slum dwellers.28 The first two of the second set 
of indicators capture two distinct forms of health risk that the slum dwellers face. One is 
                                                 
26
 We acknowledge that the indicator may underestimate the level of deprivation, as the questionnaire does not directly 
inquire if the sanitation facilities are improved or not. However, barring a few cases of no access to a facility (which 
is less than 2% in Kolkata and Mumbai but around 10% in Delhi), majority of slum households (67-73%) access 
shared facilities (these are either improved flush toilets constructed by local bodies or private charitable trusts or 
mobile toilet vans, as verified during surveys). 
27
 $FFRUGLQJWRWKH0LOOHQQLXP'HYHORSPHQW*RDOV³$KRXVHLVFRQVLGHUHGWRSURYLGHDVXIILFLHQWOLYLQJDUHDIRUWKH
household members if not more than three people share the sDPHKDELWDEOHPLQLPXPRIIRXUVTXDUHPHWHUVURRP´
The website http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx?IndicatorId=0&SeriesId=711 was accessed in August 2016. 
28
 Worth QRWLQJDQLPSRUWDQWRPLVVLRQIURPRXUVHWRILQGLFDWRUVLVKRXVHKROGV¶DFFHVVWRHOHFWULFLW\ODFNLQJZKLFK
may cause being deprived of other important facilities. However, we observed that the proportion of sampled slum 
dwellers not having access to any electricity is barely statistically significantly different from zero. Moreover, more 
than 95% of slum dwellers had access to electricity for 18-24 hours. We thus decided to not include this indicator in 
order to avoid redundancy in estimation. 
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respiratory health risk assessed by the cooking facility used by the households. The link between 
indoor air-pollution and respiratory health of the household members, especially children, is well 
documented in the public health literature (see Fuentes-Leonarte et al. (2009) for a review of the 
OLWHUDWXUH :H LGHQWLI\ D KRXVHKROG DV GHSULYHG LI µIRU FRRNLQJ SXUSRVHV WKH KRXVHKROG XVHV
ELRPDVVIXHO¶RUµFRRNLQJLQWKHKRXVHWDNHVSODFHLQVLGHWKHVOHHSLQJURRPZLWKQRVPRNHRXWOHW¶
In metro cities, where the level of outdoor pollution is already high, the existence of indoor 
pollution indeed acts as health hazard to the slum dwellers. The other health risk related deprivation 
ZHFRQVLGHULVµWKHQRQ-availability of any form of KHDOWKLQVXUDQFH¶ HYHQµZKHQDQ\PHPEHULQ
WKHKRXVHKROGVXIIHUVIURPFKURQLFGLVHDVH¶RUµWKHUHLVDGLVDEOHGPHPEHULQWKHKRXVHKROG¶ 
Table 3: Indicators, deprivation cut-offs and the percentages of slum-dwellers residing in 
deprived households 
Indicator Deprivation cut-RII$KRXVHKROGLVGHSULYHG«  
Incidence of deprivation (%) 
  Kolkata   Delhi   Mumbai 
Water  
facility 
If the water source is non-improved* (UN-MDG)  
Or, stand-piped but time to fetch from source is 30 minutes 
or more  
Or, stand-piped but access duration is less than two hours per 
day    
21.2 (1.9) 
  
29.7 (1.6) 
  
10.6 (1.0) 
Sanitation 
facility 
If there is no personal facility  
Or, the personal facility is shared with others    82.4 (1.8)   80.3 (1.5)   84.4 (1.2) 
Type of 
house 
If the wall or the roof or the floor of the house is built with 
unimproved materials;#  
Or, there is no house   
74.5 (2.2) 
  
52.6 (1.8) 
  
52.6 (1.6) 
Leakage  
in house If water enters in the house through roof or ground or both   62.6 (2.5)   67.1 (1.7)   51.9 (1.7) 
Over-
crowding 
If more than three persons live per bedroom  
(UN-HABITAT, 2010)    65.0 (2.2)   64.9 (1.7)   63.2 (1.6) 
Respiratory 
health risk 
If biomass fuel is used  
Or, cooking is done inside sleeping room with no smoke 
outlet   
26.8 (2.2) 
  
39.0 (1.8) 
  
19.7 (1.3) 
Health 
insurance 
If any member is suffering from chronic disease or there is 
any disabled member,  
And, no one in household has any health insurance scheme    
42.8 (2.5) 
  
24.3 (1.6) 
  
24.8 (1.5) 
Savings 
instrument If no member in household has any instrument for savings
##
 
  
19.4 (2.0) 
  
15.6 (1.4) 
  
15.7 (1.2) 
Asset 
ownership 
If the household does not have any of the assets: washing 
machine, refrigerator, air conditioning machine, computer, 
four-wheeler, and additional rent generating property in city   
60.7 (2.6) 
  
44.3 (1.9) 
  
34.5 (1.6) 
Information 
instrument 
If the household does not have a land-line phone,  
And, the number of mobile phones is less than the number of 
adults (15 years or more) in a household   
83.0 (1.7) 
  
88.6 (1.1) 
  
64.6 (1.6) 
Education 
attainment If no household member has 10 or more years of schooling    41.7 (2.6)   43.4 (1.9)   17.2 (1.2) 
 Equally weighted average of all deprivations    52.7 (0.9)   50.0 (0.7)   39.9 (0.6) 
Source: AXWKRUV¶RZQFRPSXWDWLRQV6WDQGDUGHUURUVDUHUHSRUWHGLQSDUHQWKHVHV 
*
- Unimproved sources include tanker truck, small cart, non-mineral bottled water, surface water (river/pond/lake) and other sources. 
#
- Unimproved floor materials: mud, dung, sand, loose brick, stone slab, bamboo, and raw wood planks. Unimproved wall materials: 
thatch, palm leaf, grass, wood, mud, bamboo, stone slab, rustic mat, tile, un-burnt brick, loosely packed stones, and tin-shed. 
Unimproved roof materials: thatch, palm leaf, wood, mud, bamboo, stone slab, rustic mat, tile, un-burnt brick, cardboard, and tin. 
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Indicator Deprivation cut-RII$KRXVHKROGLVGHSULYHG« 
 
Incidence of deprivation (%) 
  Kolkata   Delhi   Mumbai 
##
- Savings instruments: savings account or recurring deposit in banks, savings account in post office, life insurance account, private 
provident fund account or contributory provident fund account. 
 
With the next two indicators, we capture two types of financial risk encountered by slum-dwellers. 
Most slum dwellers are employed in informal sector, which does not guarantee a steady source of 
income. In this situation, it is crucial that households are able to save that serves as insurance for 
future contingencies or to own assets that insure them against liquidity constraints (Deaton 1992, 
Ch. 6)7RFDSWXUHKRXVHKROG¶VLQDELOLW\WRVDYHZHLGHQWLI\DKRXVHKROGDVGHSULYHGLIQRPHPEHU
has any kind of savings instrument. To capture whether the household is susceptible to liquidity 
constraints, we identify a household as deprived if the household does not own any major asset. 
The penultimate indicator is information instrument, which identifies a household as deprived if 
µWKHUHLVQRODQG-OLQHSKRQH¶DQGµWKHQXPEHURIPRELOHSKRQHVLVOHVVWKDQWKHQXPEHURIDGXOW
KRXVHKROGPHPEHUV¶7KHSRVLWLYHHIIHFWRIWKHXVHRIPRELOHSKRQHLQHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWKDV
been well researched. For example, Jensen (2007) found that the adoption of mobile phones by 
fishermen and wholesalers in Kerala was associated with increase in information and improvement 
in market performance. Muto and Yamano (2009) found that an increase in mobile phone usage 
in Uganda increased market participation of farmers in remote areas. Access to mobile phone may 
also help in social and professional networking in urban areas. What justifies our choice of 
deprivation cut-off for this indicator? The use of mobile phone has increased drastically in 
developing countries. According to the World Bank, the number of mobile cellular subscriptions 
per hundred people in India in 2014 was 74, whereas the percentage of adult population (fifteen 
years or older) in the same year was 71%. The ratio of the number of cell phone to the number of 
adult population in India is larger than one and the ratio is expected to be much larger in metro 
cities. Thus, we consider not owning a cell phone by an adult member as a reflection of deprivation 
in this indicator.  
The final indicator that we include in our list is education attainment, which is a crucial SoL 
dimension. Education is important as human capital and is crucial for enhancing capability (Saito, 
2003) as well as having various positive externalities. We identify a household as deprived if no 
member in the household has completed ten or more years of education. Why is the justification 
for choosing the cut-off? In 2010, the Right of Children to Free Compulsory Education (RTE) 
became operative, which entitled every child in the age group of 6-14 the right to elementary 
education. Thus, completing eight years of education is mandatory by law and due to the 
competitive nature in metro cities we set a slightly higher deprivation cut-off of ten years of 
schooling or the completion of secondary education.29 
                                                 
29
 In fact, tKHFRPSOHWLRQRIVHFRQGDU\HGXFDWLRQRUWHQ\HDUVRIVFKRROLQJLVWKHILUVWUHFRJQL]HGHGXFDWLRQµGHJUHH¶
one may accomplish. The Indian government is trying to improve the quality of secondary education with targets of 
achieving gross enrolment ratio of 100% by 2017 and universal retention rate by 2020. For further details, see GoI 
(2015). 
     
 
19 
The final set of columns in Table 3 report the proportion of slum-dwellers in each city that are 
residing in households that are deprived in each of the eleven indicators. The incidences of 
deprivation in all indicators appear to be higher in Kolkata and Delhi slums. The average 
incidences of deprivations in all eleven indicators are 52.7% in Kolkata slums, 50% in Delhi slums 
and around 40% in Mumbai slums.30 An interesting observation is that there exist statistically 
significant differences across the slums of three cities. Unlike the comparison based on monetary 
indicators, the average incidence of deprivation in Kolkata slums is observed to be higher than that 
in Delhi slums.31 Table 3 only provides a summary of deprivation profiles in different indicators, 
but it does not provide any information on the extent of multiple disadvantages that slum dwellers 
face. 
Figure 3: Complementary cumulative distribution of multiple deprivations and the 
Adjusted Headcount Ratio 
    
Panel I Panel II 
 
In order to reflect the joint distribution of deprivations, we present two diagrams in Figure 3, where 
the Panel I presents the joint distribution of deprivations using a complementary cumulative 
distribution of multiple deprivations (CDMD, hereafter).32 The horizontal axis denotes the number 
of multiple deprivations and the vertical axis represents the percentage of population. The height 
of a CDMD denotes the proportion of slum dwellers who reside in households that face at least a 
certain number of multiple deprivations. The Panel II of Figure 3 presents the adjusted headcount 
ratios (Alkire and Foster, 2011) for the corresponding deprivation counts, which is a product of 
two components: the proportion of slum dwellers facing multiple deprivations in at least a certain 
                                                 
30
 The average-incidence of deprivations in all indicators is equivalent to the union approach based adjusted-
headcount-ratio when all indicators are equally weighted (Alkire and Foster, 2011).  
31
 We have also compared cities using unequal weights across indicators and the comparisons are robust to alternative 
weights. 
32
 Pair-wise association between indicators are reported in Appendix B to reflect the bivariate joint distributions. None 
of the 11 indicators are perfectly associated with any other indicator. 
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number of indicators (incidence) and the average share of indicators these multiply deprived slum 
dwellers are deprived in (intensity).33  
In the slums of all three cities, nearly all slum dwellers reside in households that are deprived in at 
least one of the eleven indicators. Stark differences across cities are observed, however, when we 
ask how many slum dwellers reside in households with a larger number of simultaneous 
deprivations. If we ask how many slum-dwellers reside in households with at least five 
deprivations, the answer is more than 70% in Kolkata, nearly 70% in Delhi and more than 40% in 
Mumbai. In Kolkata and Delhi slums, more than a quarter of the slum dwellers reside in household 
facing at least 7 deprivations. The adjusted headcount ratios across three cities are observed to be 
statistically significantly different for a large range of multiple deprivations. 
From both type of analyses of SoL, we observe that the slums in Mumbai are better off than the 
slums in Kolkata and Delhi. The slum dwellers in Mumbai, on average, enjoy both higher level of 
monetary well-being as well as less multiple deprivations. From the descriptive analysis in this 
section, we observe that although the slums of Kolkata and Delhi are indistinguishable in terms of 
monetary indicators, the slum-dwellers of Kolkata suffer a larger number of multiple deprivations 
on average than their Delhi counterparts.  
The slums and its dwellers, as we have observed in Section 3, are characteristically quite different 
across three cities. In fact, the different characteristics may be quite differently associated with the 
SoL of the slum dwellers of three cities. It may also be the case that these characteristics are 
differently correlated to the monetary and the non-monetary SoL. Being able to understand how 
these characteristics are associated with the SoL may be helpful in understanding the living 
conditions better as well as may provide better policy guidance. With this purpose in mind, in the 
next section, we use simple linear multivariable regression technique to explore the association 
between the various characteristics of slums (and its dwellers) and the indicators of both monetary 
and non-monetary SoL. 
5 Correlates of standard of living in Slums 
In this section, our aim is two-fold. First, we aim to understand how various observable 
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKH VOXPV DQG WKH GZHOOLQJ KRXVHKROGV µZLWKLQ HDFK FLW\¶ DUH VLPLODUO\ RU
differently associated (or correlated and thus referred as correlates) with monetary vis-à-vis non-
monetary indicators of househoOGV¶ 6R/ Our second aim is to understand how some of the 
FRPPRQFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDUHVLPLODUO\RUGLIIHUHQWO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKKRXVHKROGV¶6R/ZLWKLQVOXPV
µDFURVVGLIIHUHQWFLWLHV¶For both the purposes, we resort to multivariate linear regression analyses. 
For regressions, we consider households as our unit of analysis rather than individuals as the 
characteristics are defined only at the slum-level and at the household-level. In the final part of 
                                                 
33
 For further discussions and interpretations on this poverty measurement methodology, readers are referred to Alkire 
and Foster (2011) and Chapter 5 of Alkire et al. (2015). 
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this section, through a decomposition analysis, we explore the indicators that are responsible for 
differences across correlates and across monetary and non-monetary approaches.  
In Table 4-Table 6, we present the regression results for Kolkata, Delhi and Mumbai.34 In each 
table, we report five regression models: Model-I1, Model-I2, Model-C1, Model-C2 and Model-
M. The left-hand side variables are the household-level monetary and non-monetary indicators 
presented in Section 4. The left-hand side variable is the logarithm of per-capita total household 
income in Model-I1, the logarithm of per-capita household wage earning in Model-I2, the 
logarithm of per-capita total household consumption expenditure in Model-C1, the logarithm of 
per-capita total household consumption expenditure on food and cooking fuel in Model-C2, and 
the multidimensional household deprivation score in Model-M. In the top half of each table, we 
report the common correlates across all three cities and in the bottom half (divided by a separator 
line), we report the city-specific correlates. 
In order to capture the heterogeneity in slums and amongst its dwellers across and within cities, 
we classify the correlates into two broad categories: household-level characteristics and slum-level 
characteristics. Household characteristics include intrinsic characteristics FRYHULQJ KHDG¶V
JHQGHU KRXVHKROG¶V VL]H DJH GHSHQGHQFH UHOLJLRXV EHOLHI HWKQLF EDFNJURXQG RU SURYLQFLDO
identity, duration of migration), socio-economic identification characteristics (covering PDS 
cardholding status, caste reservation certificate holding status), and economic contractual 
characteristics (covering tenancy type, and type of job contracts of the members). Slum level 
characteristics comprLVHRIVOXP¶VVSDWLDOORFDWLRQDQGWHQXUHVHFXULW\OHJDOSURWHFWLRQVWDWXV:H
acknowledge that each regression (that represents some measure of SoL either from monetary or 
non-monetary sides) may have many other pertinent observable characteristics, but we ensured 
that the selected correlates are free from potential endogeneity problem.35 In this section, we are 
mainly interested in finding out how various characteristics are associated with different measures 
of SoL. 
5.1 Correlates of monetary standard of living 
,Q WKH ILUVW WZR PRGHOV , DQG , ZLWKLQ HDFK WDEOH ZH SUHVHQW WKH FRUUHODWHV RI KRXVHKROGV¶
monetary SoL assessed by the per-capita total household income and the per-capita income from 
wage earning. Both models within each city yield similar results. In all three cities, the households 
that consistently reflect lower monetary SoL are characterized with female heads, larger sizes, 
higher child dependence, and those not having at least one member who is either a government 
employee/pensioner or have a private contractual job. We observe that the households with higher 
old-age dependence to have lower monetary SoL in Delhi and Mumbai only. 
                                                 
34
 For the sake of brevity, we only report the coefficients of each correlates and suppress the standard errors. 
35
 For example, the years of schooling is expected to increase monetary SoL (say, income) of household, but we refrain 
from using it as a correlate since this may lead to endogeneity issue in the non-monetary regression model where the 
left-hand-side variable includes education as an indicator. 
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Other common characteristics are differently associated across cities. In Delhi, we do not observe 
any statisticalO\ VLJQLILFDQW GLIIHUHQFHV DFURVV WKH KRXVHKROGV¶ FDVWH RU UHOLJLRQ RU ZKHWKHU WKH
household has any caste certificate or not; whereas, the Other General households in Mumbai and 
OBC households with caste certificates in Kolkata appear to have higher incomes and earnings 
compared to the Hindu General households. Furthermore, PDS (public distribution system) card 
KROGLQJVWDWXVRIWKHKRXVHKROGVGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRVLJQLI\DQ\GLIIHUHQFHLQKRXVHKROGV¶PRQHWDU\
SoL in Delhi and Mumbai; but the APL (above poverty line) households in Kolkata are relatively 
better off than the BPL (below poverty line) households and the households without cards.36  
:HQH[WORRNDWWKHFRUUHODWHVLQWKHERWWRPKDOIRIHDFKWDEOH/RRNLQJDWWKHKRXVHKROGV¶SHULRG
of migration (refer to Figure 1 in Section 3), which can alternatively be thought of as duration of 
stay in city, we observe that those migrated after 1980 in Kolkata appear to have higher per-capita 
incomes than those that migrated earlier. The period of migration does not seem to matter 
statistically significantly both in Delhi and Mumbai with regard to per-capita incomes.37 Delving 
into the location specificity of slums within each city, we observe no difference in the per-capita 
incomes of households across different regions within Kolkata.38 However, the regional 
differences are quite stark within Delhi, where the slum households in Central Delhi, South Delhi 
and New Delhi appear to be better off than those in East Delhi (situated in eastern periphery).39 
The spatial differences are also observed across six official zones within Mumbai.40 The slum 
households in Inner Island city and Outer Western Suburbs of Mumbai (i.e. heart of the city and 
its adjacent area) enjoy statistically significantly higher monetary SoL compared to those in Outer 
Island City (periphery).41 Furthermore, looking across the tenure security (i.e. protection/notified) 
status of Mumbai slums, we expectedly observe that the households in the protected slum 
(protection status conferred between 1970 and 1998) areas enjoy higher per-capita incomes and 
                                                 
36
 It should be noted that of the surveyed households in Kolkata only 7% have BPL+ (i.e. BPL, Annapurna or 
Antyodaya) cards, 84% are APL and 9% have no card. In Mumbai, 21% households have BPL+ card, 70% are APL 
and 9% have no card. In Delhi, however, 49% households have BPL+ cards, only 19% are APL and 32% have no 
card.  
37
 However, Marx et al. (2013) noted that in the slums of Kenya, Bangladesh, the living standard of households do not 
seem to be improving over time (i.e. the number years either spent in slum or the household first leaving the 
countryside). 
38
 In the absence of any official regional categorization for Kolkata, we create six regional divisions consisting of 
different boroughs and wards as follows. North-West: boroughs 1, 2 and 4; North-East: borough 3 and wards 57 and 
58; South-West: boroughs 9, 14 and 13; South-East: boroughs 10, 11 and 12; West: borough 15; Central: rest of the 
areas. 
39
 For Delhi, regrouping 11 revenue districts as follows creates regional divisions. East: districts North-east, Shahdara, 
and East; Central: district Central; South: district South; South-east: district South-east; New Delhi: district New 
Delhi; North and West: districts South-west, West, North-West and North. It should be noted that areas in Central, 
South and New Delhi are either close to or are better integrated to the heart of the city, and are thus expected to be 
relatively well off areas. We observe slum dwellers in these areas to enjoy better economic prospects. 
40
 The city of Mumbai has six official zonal divisions by combining different wards (See, Risbud 2003, pp. 2). Inner 
island city: A, B, C, D and E; Outer island city: F/S, F/N, G/S and GN; Inner Western Suburbs: H/E, H/W, K/E and 
K/W; Outer Western Suburbs: P/N, P/S, R/S, R/C and R/N; Inner Eastern Suburbs: L, M/E, M/W; and Outer Eastern 
Suburbs: T, S and N. 
41
  For discussions on rural spatial poverty traps, see Jalan and Ravallion (2002) and Golgher (2012); for discussion 
on urban slum poverty traps see Marx et al. (2013). 
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earnings than the rest. Incidentally, we do not observe any significant difference in earnings 
between the tenement (chawl) dwellers and the squatter (zopadpatti) dwellers. A noticeable 
difference across cities however arises when we look at the ethnic background of the households: 
WKHKRXVHKROGV¶VWDWHRIRULJLQGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRPDWWHULQFDVHRILQFRPHHDUQLQJVLQ.RONDWDDQG
Delhi, but in Mumbai, the migrants from North-&HQWUDOSDUWRI WKH FRXQWU\ DQG WKH µUHVW¶HDUQ
higher than the natives of Maharashtra.42  
In the next two PRGHOV&DQG&ZHSUHVHQWWKHFRUUHODWHVRIKRXVHKROGV¶PRQHWDU\6R/ZKHQ
it is assessed by the per-capita total household consumption expenditure and the per-capita total 
household consumption expenditure on food and cooking fuel. We have already seen in the 
previous section that the average consumption expenditures and their distributions were not as 
starkly different from the income counterparts. We however explore now whether per-capita 
consumption expenditures have different correlates in slums within each city. Like incomes, the 
households that are consistently associated with lower monetary (consumption) SoL are 
households with larger sizes, headed by females, and with higher child dependence. Unlike income 
however the existence of government employees or members with private contract does not matter 
in slums of Kolkata and Mumbai. In Delhi, having a government employee in the household is 
associated with significantly higher consumption expenditure. We do not observe any consistent 
pattern in consumption expenditure across households from different caste or religion background. 
Table 4: Correlates of Standard of Living in Kolkata Slums 
    Model-I1  Model-I2  Model-C1  Model-C2  Model-M 
               
 
Female Headed HH   -0.174 ***   -0.197 ***   -0.179 ***   -0.118 ***   0.044 ** 
Size of HH   -0.141 ***   -0.125 **   -0.170 ***   -0.146 ***   0.021 * 
Square of Size of HH   0.006     0.005     0.008 ***   0.006 ***   -0.001   
Child dependence   -0.899 ***   -0.943 ***   -0.277 ***   -0.381 ***   0.125 *** 
Old-age dependence   -0.437 *   -0.364     -0.087     -0.016     0.139 ** 
Hindu General (Omitted)                               
SC/ST (with caste certificate)   -0.040     -0.074     0.038     0.033     0.015   
SC/ST (without caste certificate)   -0.052     -0.024     -0.106 *   -0.011     0.083 *** 
OBC (with caste certificate)   0.377 *   0.376 *   0.240 *   0.119     -0.141 *** 
OBC (without caste certificate)   -0.107     -0.049     -0.068     0.028     0.035   
Muslim General   0.045     0.032     0.006     0.143 ***   0.017   
Others General   -0.043     -0.042     -0.197     -0.239 *   0.026   
PDS: BPL+ household (Omitted)                               
PDS: APL household   0.219 **   0.165 *   0.075     0.080     -0.060 *** 
PDS: No Card households   0.028     -0.041     -0.076     -0.055     -0.019   
Job: Private contract (Omitted)                               
Job: Govt Employee/Pensioner   0.240 **   0.241 **   0.054     0.072     -0.046   
Job: Others   -0.165 ***   -0.167 ***   -0.033     0.026     0.033 * 
Native to West Bengal (Omitted)                              
Migrant: North Central India  0.068     0.093     0.061     0.001     -0.020   
Migrant: Foreign  0.035     0.108     0.061     0.098 *   -0.024   
                                                 
42
 This finding supports the findings of Mohan (1979) in the developing country contexts in general. 
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    Model-I1  Model-I2  Model-C1  Model-C2  Model-M 
Migrant: Rest of India  -0.148     -0.109     -0.091     0.033     0.013   
Migrated (1950-80) (Omitted)                               
Migrated (before 1950)   -0.029     -0.063     0.016     0.007     -0.037 ** 
Migrated (after 1980)   0.207 ***   0.143 **   0.096 *   0.069     -0.051 ** 
Own house (Omitted)                               
Rented house (thika/pagdi)   -0.109 *   -0.068     -0.103 **   -0.141 ***   0.125 *** 
Rented house (informal)   0.015     0.108     0.149 **   -0.023     0.093 *** 
Rented (other arrangements)   -0.076     -0.054     -0.051     -0.116     0.127 *** 
South-East Kolkata (Omitted)                               
Central Kolkata   -0.023     0.009     0.002     0.016     -0.063 ** 
West Kolkata   -0.114     -0.080     -0.095     -0.041     -0.037   
South-West Kolkata   -0.110     -0.080     0.009     0.035     -0.051 ** 
North-East Kolkata   -0.104     -0.091     0.007     0.022     -0.022   
North-West Kolkata   -0.071     -0.025     -0.094     0.024     -0.020   
Constant   8.436 ***   8.373 ***   8.044 ***   7.541 ***   0.435 *** 
Observations   796     787     808     808     808   
R-squared   0.256     0.276     0.317     0.257     0.234   
***
-Statistically significant at ߙ = 1%, **-Statistically significant at ߙ = 5%, *-Statistically significant at ߙ = 10%. 
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Table 5: Correlates of Standard of Living in Delhi Slums 
    Model-I1  Model-I2  Model-C1  Model-C2  Model-M 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Female Headed HH   -0.184 ***   -0.202 ***   -0.146 ***   -0.084 **   -0.008   
Size of HH   -0.226 ***   -0.203 ***   -0.249 ***   -0.172 ***   0.003   
Square of Size of HH   0.011 ***   0.010 ***   0.012 ***   0.007 ***   0.000   
Child dependence   -0.687 ***   -0.740 ***   -0.180 **   -0.083     0.143 *** 
Old-age dependence   -0.618 ***   -0.737 ***   -0.268     -0.213     0.107   
Hindu General (Omitted)                               
SC/ST (with caste certificate)   0.019     -0.007     0.030     0.037     -0.009   
SC/ST (without caste certificate)   0.039     0.018     0.011     0.026     0.070 *** 
OBC (with caste certificate)   -0.046     -0.073     0.065     0.018     -0.023   
OBC (without caste certificate)   0.009     -0.007     -0.047     0.026     0.016   
Muslim General   -0.063     -0.080     -0.010     0.024     0.020   
Others General   -0.069     -0.067     0.037     0.172     -0.083 *** 
PDS: BPL+ households (Omitted)                               
PDS: APL households   0.047     0.059     0.098 ***   0.103 ***   -0.004   
PDS: No Card households   0.054     0.075 *   0.069 **   0.063 **   0.031 ** 
Job: Private contract (Omitted)                               
Job: Govt Employee/Pensioner   0.360 ***   0.371 ***   0.162 **   0.143 **   -0.064 ** 
Job: Others   -0.201 ***   -0.200 ***   -0.080 *   -0.050     0.041 * 
Native to Delhi & North West India 
(Omitted)                              
Migrant: North Central India  0.086     0.071     0.054     0.012     -0.026   
Migrant: Rest   0.029     0.027     0.047     0.070     -0.001   
Migrated (1970-80) (Omitted)                               
Migrated (before 1970)   0.025     0.012     0.029     0.061     -0.008   
Migrated (1980-90)   0.013     -0.006     0.069 *   0.087 ***   0.000   
Migrated (after 1990)   0.011     0.020     0.065     0.037     0.006   
Owned House (Omitted)                              
Not own house   -0.012     -0.002     0.132 ***   -0.064     0.006   
Zone: East Delhi (Omitted)                               
Zone: Central Delhi   0.170 **   0.166 **   0.233 ***   0.193 ***   -0.028   
Zone: South Delhi   0.143 ***   0.153 ***   0.112 **   0.016     0.028   
Zone: South-East Delhi   0.089     0.074     0.077     0.115 **   0.079 *** 
Zone: New Delhi   0.148 **   0.148 **   0.180 ***   0.114 **   0.089 *** 
Zone: North and West Delhi   0.044     0.036     0.010     0.029     0.038 ** 
Constant   8.861 ***   8.799 ***   8.266 ***   7.583 ***   0.357 *** 
Observations (households)   862     860     864     864     864   
R-squared   0.374     0.350     0.406     0.282     0.168   
***
-Statistically significant at ߙ = 1%, **-Statistically significant at ߙ = 5%, *-Statistically significant at ߙ = 10%. 
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Table 6: Correlates of Standard of Living in Mumbai Slums 
    Model-I1   Model-I2   Model-C1   Model-C2   Model-M 
 
                              
Female Headed household   -0.183 ***   -0.200 ***   -0.108 ***   -0.050 *   0.033 ** 
Size of household   -0.192 ***   -0.176 ***   -0.196 ***   -0.205 ***   0.019 ** 
Square of Size of Household   0.010 ***   0.009 ***   0.009 ***   0.010 ***   -0.001   
Child dependence   -0.789 ***   -0.780 ***   -0.298 ***   -0.298 ***   0.098 *** 
Old-age dependence   -0.462 ***   -0.651 ***   -0.452 ***   -0.248 *   0.049   
Hindu General (Omitted)                               
SC/ST (with caste certificate)   -0.007     -0.004     0.074 *   0.068 **   0.032 * 
SC/ST (without caste certificate)   -0.031     -0.038     0.016     0.033     0.059 *** 
OBC (with caste certificate)   -0.005     -0.023     0.011     0.017     -0.040 ** 
OBC (without caste certificate)   -0.043     -0.011     0.041     0.054     0.010   
Muslim General   -0.048     -0.080     0.014     0.091 **   0.028 * 
Others General   0.298 **   0.264 *   0.082     0.112 *   -0.005   
PDS: BPL+ household (Omitted)                               
PDS: APL household   -0.014     -0.021     0.054 *   0.008     0.001   
PDS: No Card households   0.126 *   0.124 *   -0.026     0.005     0.034   
Job (private contract) (Omitted)                               
Job (Govt Employee/Pensioner)   0.291 ***   0.291 ***   0.048     0.059 *   -0.064 *** 
Job (Others)   -0.163 ***   -0.174 ***   0.005     -0.003     0.044 *** 
Native to Maharashtra (Omitted)                               
Migrants: North-Central India  0.173 ***   0.169 ***   0.180 ***   0.129 ***   0.008   
Migrants: Western India  -0.007     0.003     0.021     -0.008     -0.037 * 
Migrants: Southern India  0.014     0.014     0.140 ***   0.087 **   0.008   
Migrants: Rest   0.127 *   0.138 *   0.160 ***   0.109 **   0.013   
Migrated (before 1950) (Omitted)                              
Migrated (1950-70)   -0.008     -0.027     -0.013     -0.001     0.016   
Migrated (1970-90)   -0.041     -0.052     -0.023     -0.054 *   0.027 * 
Migrated (after 1990)   -0.135 **   -0.142 **   0.023     -0.049     0.033 * 
Owned House (omitted)                               
Rented (Thika/Pagdi)   0.082     0.112 **   0.194 ***   0.000     0.035 ** 
Rented (Informal)   -0.110 *   -0.105 *   0.262 ***   -0.009     0.050 ** 
Rented (Other arrangements)   0.012     0.016     0.361 ***   0.007     0.016   
Tenement (Chawl) Houses (Omitted)                               
Squatter (Zopadpatti) Houses   0.087     0.077     0.020     0.058     -0.026   
Protected Slums till 1998 (Omitted)                               
Declared/Notified Slums (post 1998)   -0.103 **   -0.114 ***   -0.031     -0.047 *   -0.004   
Non-notified (but censused)   -0.104 *   -0.115 *   0.034     0.031     -0.023   
Protection status not available   0.052     0.061     0.044     -0.013     -0.059 *** 
Zone: Outer Island City (Omitted)                               
Zone: Inner Island City   0.157 *   0.138     0.101 *   0.030     0.008   
Zone: Inner Western Suburbs   0.092     0.110 *   0.057     0.029     -0.008   
Zone: Outer Western Suburbs   0.154 **   0.180 ***   0.061     0.058     0.041 * 
Zone: Inner Eastern Suburbs   -0.066     -0.067     -0.063     0.005     0.031   
Zone: Outer Eastern Suburbs   0.103     0.106     0.009     0.052     0.018   
Constant   8.996 ***   8.944 ***   8.123 ***   7.711 ***   0.252 *** 
Observations   1089     1080     1093     1088     1093   
R-squared   0.302     0.296     0.364     0.326     0.164   
***
-Statistically significant at ߙ = 1%, **-Statistically significant at ߙ = 5%, *-Statistically significant at ߙ = 10%. 
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We next look at the correlates in the bottom half of each table. Like income, we observe the slum 
households in Kolkata migrating after 1980 have higher per-capita consumption expenditure in 
both indicators. Similar results are observed in Delhi. In Mumbai, however we do not observe any 
difference across the households migrated at different point of time. As expected, not having own 
house is associated with higher overall expenditure due to rent payment. In Kolkata, however, the 
finding is mixed, may be due to the fact that a significant number of households are in tenement 
houses paying a very minimal rent (see, Bag et al. 2016) owing to various rent controls as discussed 
in section 2. Finally, we observe similar regional pattern across geographic regions within each 
city as we have observed in case of incomes. We thus did not observe any surprising differences 
between the correlates of per-capita incomes/earnings and consumption expenditures.43 
5.2 Non-monetary correlates vis-à-vis monetary correlates 
In model-0LQHDFKWDEOHZHSUHVHQWWKHFRUUHODWHVRIKRXVHKROG¶VQRQ-monetary SoL, where the 
dependent variable is the multidimensional deprivation score obtained from counting the 
deprivations in the eleven indicators presented in Table 3. In order to avoid the loss of information 
on any deprivation and to avoid the choice of any arbitrary poverty cut-off, we choose to use 
KRXVHKROGV¶XQFHQVRUHGGHSULYDWLRQVFRUHVDVWKHGHSHQGHQWYDULDEOH,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWLQ
contrast to the monetary indicators, a larger deprivation score is associated with a worse SoL and 
so an opposite sign of each corresponding regression coefficient lead to the same effect.  
Although we observe some correlates to be similarly and consistently related to the non-monetary 
context as in the monetary context, yet there are some crucial differences that are worth noting and 
call for policy attention. Similar to monetary SoL, the households headed by females and 
households with larger sizes reflect lower SoL in Kolkata and Mumbai and households with higher 
child dependence are worse off in all three cities. Another consistent result between Model-M and 
Model-I¶s is observed across households¶ primary job categories. A striking difference among the 
common set of variables is that the SC/ST households that do not hold any caste certificate appear 
to be consistently worse of within slums in all three cities in terms of non-monetary SoL. Such 
consistency across cities was not observed for any monetary indicator.44 
We now explore the set of city-specific indicators. Looking at the Kolkata slums, we observe three 
major differences on how the correlates are associated with monetary vis-à-vis non-monetary SoL. 
First, the households (or their earlier generations) that migrated to the city before 1950 as well as 
after 1980 appear to be non-monetarily better off compared to those that migrated between 1950 
and 1980. In case of monetary SoL, we observe the older generation of migrants to have lower 
incomes and earnings (not always statistically significantly though). Those who migrated after 
                                                 
43
 Our findings based on per-FDSLWDH[SHQGLWXUHVIRU'HOKLSDUWLDOO\VXSSRUWV0LWUD¶VILQGLQJVLQWHUPVRILQWUD-
city spatial differences, female-headed households, and FDVWHVEXWFRQWUDGLFWV0LWUD¶VILQGLQJVUHODWHGWRKRXVHKROG
size or child dependence (the proportion of children). We observe households with large size and higher child 
dependence to have lower per-capita consumption expenditure. 
44
 Mitra (2005) observed SC/ST households usually resided in poor quality houses in Delhi slums. We however do 
not observe SC/ST households to be usually worse off non-monetarily than general Hindu households but SC/ST 
households without caste certificates are non-monetarily worse off than general Hindu households.  
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1980 are statistically significantly better off on average than the rest in terms of incomes, earnings 
as well as per-capita total expenditures. Second, those owning houses are statistically significantly 
better off non-monetarily than those who are renting. Third, the slum-KRXVHKROGV LQ.RONDWD¶V
Central and South-west regions appear to be statistically significantly better off non-monetarily 
FRPSDUHGWRWKRVHLQ.RONDWD¶V6RXWK-east region. 
In the case of Mumbai, we observe four differences. First, the slums of Mumbai house the most 
diversified communities from different regions of India. We observe that the migrant households 
from Western and Southern India are non-monetarily better off compared to the natives, but, it is 
interesting to note that although the households from North-central India are monetarily better off 
than the natives, but their monetary advantages are not translated into better non-monetary SoL. 
Second, those who migrated more recently, i.e. after 1970, appear to be statistically significantly 
worse off non-monetarily than those that migrated before 1950. It may be of interest to point out 
that those migrating after 1990 are not only worse off non-monetarily, but also have lower incomes 
and earnings. Third, the households owning houses, as observed in Kolkata, appear to have higher 
non-monetary SoL than those residing under Pagri tenancy system or with informal tenancy. 
Fourth, we observe that in Mumbai higher incomes and earnings of the households in protected 
(pre-1998) slums compared to those in notified and non-notified slum areas, does not transpire to 
higher non-monetary SoL. In fact, the households in slums that are legally protected from eviction 
(protected/notified/declared) are non-monetarily indifferent to those living in non-notified slums.45 
This observation questions 81¶VLGHDWRZDUGVLPSURYLQJOLYLQJVWDQGDUGVLQVOXPVWKURXJKWHQXUH
security. Finally, the households in slums of Outer Western suburbs are non-monetarily worse off 
vis-à-vis those in Outer island city, despite higher incomes and earnings. 
In case of Delhi, we observe two striking differences. First, although like Kolkata and Mumbai, 
ZHREVHUYHVLPLODUHIIHFWVRIKHDGV¶JHQGHURUKRXVHKROGV¶VL]HVRQPRQHWDU\6R/VXFKHIIHFWV
unlike Kolkata and Mumbai, are not observed in the non-monetary context. Second, we observe 
the households in New Delhi to be less non-monetarily well-off compared to those in East Delhi, 
despite being monetarily better off. Similarly, we observe higher monetary SoL among households 
in Central Delhi compared to East Delhi, but no statistically significantly difference in non-
monetary SoL is observed.46  
5.3 Why are these differences? A decomposition analysis 
From our discussions in the previous sub-section, we have observed that characteristics are often 
differently associated across monetary and non-monetary approaches in different cities. Since the 
                                                 
45
 We should also point that the households in legally protected slums are non-monetarily worse off than those whose 
tenure status is unavailable. Note that those slums for which the legal status is unavailable are quite diversified 
collection, some of which are on central government land and thus are not covered in any slum development program 
XQGHUWKH6OXP$FW2QHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUFRPPRQO\QRWLFHGDFURVVWKHVHVOXPVLVWKDWWKHUH¶s hardly any deprivation 
in water facility indicator. 
46
 To test the robustness of our main findings in non-monetary regressions, we reconstruct the deprivation scores using 
other weighting schemes and for different combinations of deprivation cut-offs of indicators. Our main findings 
discussed above are mostly robust to these changes.  
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non-monetary counting deprivation scores consist of deprivations in eleven indicators, it is not 
readily visible why and how certain characteristics are significantly associated with the non-
monetary deprivation score. From policy perspective, it is important to understand which particular 
indicators are dictating these associations, which can be accomplished by exploring the 
decomposition of deprivations across certain characteristics using spider diagrams presented in 
Figure 4.  
In Panels I and II of the Figure 4, we present two cases from Delhi and Mumbai where one region 
in each city has higher monetary SoL but lower non-monetary SoL. In Delhi, as we have observed 
from Table 5, households in New Delhi appear to have higher monetary SoL but lower non-
monetary SoL. Are there particular indicators where households, on average, are more deprived 
than the household in East Delhi? Panel I shows, in fact, that in none of the eleven indicators the 
households in New Delhi are less deprived than those in East Delhi. Rather, in three indicators ± 
sanitation facility, over-crowding, and the type of house, the households in New Delhi are 
significantly worse off. By further decomposing the sanitation facility indicator, we find that the 
93% of the surveyed households in New Delhi area do not have personal toilets, whereas the 
corresponding figure is 64% for East Delhi region. Despite having higher incomes, the slum-
dwellers in New Delhi area are more deprived in the µtype of house¶ indicator. This is mainly 
because a majority of New Delhi slums falls in the highly-regulated zone, where the city council 
does not allow further construction activities by the slum dwellers. Moreover, as economic activity 
at the centre of a city potentially fetches more income, the houses in the slums of New Delhi are 
relative more over-crowded. 
In Panel II, we compare the Outer Island region (one of the biggest contiguous slums, Dharavi, is 
situated here) and the Outer Western suburb (Andheri area and beyond) of Mumbai. The 
households in Outer Western suburb are less deprived in water sources, but they are significantly 
more deprived in two housing related indicators ± type of house and leakage in house. The larger 
deprivation in water facility is mainly due to inadequate water supply per day. The decomposition 
of the leakage indicator reveals that the households in the Outer Western suburb zone mainly suffer 
much higher leakage (43.7%) through roof vis-à-vis those in Outer Island region (31%). Higher 
leakages through roof is expected when 60% of the Outer Western Suburb households reside in 
non-improved houses, but surprisingly higher per-capita incomes of these households on average 
did not translate into better housing and lower roof-leakage rate. The underlying reason may be 
WKDWRIWKHKRXVHKROGVRI2XWHU:HVWHUQ6XEXUEUHVLGHLQµGHFODUHG¶VOXPV; whereas only 39% 
in Outer Island city reside in µprotected¶ slums. The µdeclared slum¶ status under slum acts, 
although prevent households from eviction (without an alternative housing), does not confer 
property rights of the plot of the houses to the owner/ occupier, but imposes a status quo on further 
constructions and repairs works of the existing structures.47  
                                                 
47
 The relationship between tenure security and investments in housing/land has been not been empirically well 
explored in slums. However, Field (2005) and Galiani and Schargrodsky (2010) showed that formal titling could 
encourage investments in poor urban areas. 
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In Panels III-IV, an interesting pattern is observed when we compare the households with own 
houses to households living in rented houses in slums of Mumbai and Kolkata. The households 
residing in rented houses do not necessarily appear to have lower monetary SoL, but strictly lower 
non-monetary SoL. The households in rented accommodations do not appear to have lower 
deprivation in any non-monetary indicator. In Mumbai rather they are more deprived in education, 
savings instrument, respiratory health risk, and asset ownership. In Kolkata, the households in 
rented houses are additionally deprived in three indicators ± sanitation facility, over-crowding, and 
type of house. The situation is particularly deplorable for the thika tenants in Kolkata as their 
earning is significantly less than those owning their dwellings.  
In the next three panels (V-VII), we present the striking case comparing the SC/ST households 
ZLWKQRFDVWHFHUWLILFDWHWRWKHUHVWRIWKHFLW\¶VVOXPKRXVHKROGVLQHDFKRIWKHWKUHHFLWLHV7KLV
group does not appear to be statistically significantly monetarily less well-off compared to the 
Hindu General households in any city, but is non-monetarily less well-off consistently in all three 
cities as evident from the regressions presented in the previous section. In which indicators are 
they more deprived compared to the rest? We find that in Delhi and Mumbai, the SC/ST 
households with no caste certificates are more deprived in six or more of the eleven indicators. 
This group consistently lags behind in the education and asset holding indicators compared to the 
rest. In fact, strikingly we find that the SC/ST households without caste certificate are significantly 
and consistently more deprived in two indicators (education and savings) vis-à-vis SC/ST 
households with caste certificates in all cities. Further, it is noted that their situation is even worse 
in Delhi as they are more deprived in five additional indicators (water, toilet, leakage, asset and 
respiratory health). 
Lastly, in Panel VIII of Figure 4, we show how Muslim (General) households in Mumbai fare vis-
à-vis Hindu (general) households. It can be seen from Table 6 that Muslim (general) households 
earn lower incomes on average (albeit not statistically significant), but incur significantly higher 
expenditure on food and fuel (mainly due to their preference for non-vegetarian food items). 
However, general Muslim households in Mumbai are not better off in any of the eleven non-
monetary indicators than their general Hindu counterparts, but rather significantly worse off in six 
indicators ± education, savings instrument, health insurance, over-crowding and also in water 
facility and leakages. Higher deprivations for Muslim households in water and leakage indicators 
may be due to their particular spatial concentration. It is worth noting that in the Inner Eastern 
suburb area 58% of surveyed households reported leakage issues and a third of all households here 
are Muslims.48 Further, it is worth mentioning that general Muslim households in Mumbai slums 
                                                 
48
  In the Inner Eastern suburb (wards L, MW and ME) area of Mumbai has relatively higher non-monetary SoL. There 
are two striking features of this zone. First, 30% of households are Muslim and 29% are SC/ST. This is the largest 
FRQFHQWUDWLRQRIWKHVHWZRFRPPXQLWLHVKHUHDPRQJDOO]RQHVRI0XPEDL1RWDEO\RQHWKLUGRI0XPEDL¶VJHQHUDO
Muslim households reside here. Secondly, in this area, almost 84% of surveyed households reside in either protected 
or declared slums and many of these slums were created by resettling the households from various parts of the city. 
Almost 56% of the surveyed households reside in non-pucca houses and about 43% of households report some kind 
of leaking (mostly through roof).  
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are non-monetarily no different in any of the eleven indicators from the SC/ST households without 
caste certificates. 
Figure 4: Comparison of the compositions of deprivations in eleven non-monetary 
indicators across correlates 
 
 
 
Panel I Panel II Panel III 
 
 
 
Panel IV Panel V Panel VI 
  
 
Panel VII Panel VIII  
Index: 1: Education; 2: Information instrument; 3: Savings instrument; 4: Water facility; 5: Sanitation facility; 6: Over-crowding; 
7: Health Insurance; 8: Respiratory health risk; 9: Type of house; 10: Asset ownership; 11: Leakage in house. 
*  - The difference is statistically significant at 90% level of significance;  
#  - The (negative of) difference is statistically significant at 90% level of significance. 
Source$XWKRU¶VRZQFRPSXWDWLRQV 
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6 Concluding remarks 
The growth of slums appears to be an inevitable urban phenomenon in developing countries. 
National policy makers often continue to visualize and interpret slums as informal dwelling lots 
of one vulnerable group of people without making any serious attempt to analyse various aspects 
of slum lives, such as livelihoods, evictions, health, and environmental hazards. There is need for 
recognizing the fact that slums are not at all homogenous and vary both within and across cities 
by types, geographies, histories as well as by residents. There are also inimitable social hierarchies 
WKDWGHWHUPLQHWKHGZHOOHUV¶6R/ZLWKLQVOXPVZKHUHFDVWHUHOLJLRQHWKQLFLW\DQGJHQGHUSOD\D
major role. These are overlapping, cross-cutting categories and there is no uniform way of 
deciphering the relationship between this hierarchy and the level of SoL across slums of three 
cities. We attempt to measure the SoL through a more holistic approach covering housing needs, 
issues related to health and access to basic services. 
In this paper, we contribute to the literature in two ways. First, through our analysis based on three 
largest cities in India, we show that in practice it matters whether the slum-GZHOOHUV¶ OLYLQJ
standards are assessed by using a monetary approach vis-à-vis a non-monetary counting approach. 
For example, in the context of Delhi and Mumbai, we observe that higher regional monetary SoL 
does not go hand-in-hand with better non-monetary SoL. Such analysis is not common in the 
literature for studying SoL in slums. Second, we conduct a comparative study on how various 
slum-level (local governance, land market institutions etc.) and household-level characteristics or 
FRUUHODWHV DUH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK KRXVHKROGV¶ PRQHWDU\ DQG QRQ-monetary SoL within and across 
cities. We observe that the correlates are often differently (or in some cases similarly) associated 
with two different measures of SoL. A key message conveyed by this observation is that policy 
choices and designs for improving slum-GZHOOHUV¶ 6R/ QHHG WR EH DGHTXDWHO\ tempered. 
Additionally, our findings may question the efficacy of the usual policy choices, such as cash 
transfers, in automatically improving the slum-GZHOOHUV¶ QRQ-monetary multifaceted living 
conditions.  
To improve monetary and non-monetary living conditions in slums, a set of policies can be 
construed at three different levels: (a) at the household level, targeting the poor households with 
specific schemes to ameliorate key deprivations; (b) at the community level, targeting and 
improving infrastructural inadequacies (e.g. water, sanitation, drainage, electricity etc.); and (c) 
dealing with the legal aspects related to tenure security in slums through political will. Detailed 
discussion on probable public-policy choices is out of the scope of the current paper, but it is worth 
highlighting certain interesting points from our findings in the Indian context that however may 
be applicable in the context of other developing countries.  
First, we observe that indigenous SC/ST households without any caste certificates consistently 
appear to be non-monetarily less well-off in slums of all three cities. Due to the lack of their caste 
identity proofs in cities, which is normally linked to their residency status back in the state 
domicile, these SC/ST households in slums are left out of affirmative action initiatives of the local 
urban governments, which, along with several types of social exclusion, perhaps lead 
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to perpetuating deprivation in non-monetary indicators. This particular finding calls for a review 
of the strategies relating to the issuing of caste certificates by government agencies and ways of 
implementing affirmative actions in Indian urban areas.  
Second, female-headed households ± mainly comprising of elderly, widowed, and deserted women 
± are worse off both monetarily and non-monetarily in Kolkata and Mumbai. Although the local 
governments have special monetary assistance scheme for women with widowed status, the 
disbursement of endowments is not only scanty (INR 300-600 or around US$5-10 per month), but 
DOVRTXLWHLUUHJXODU0RUHRYHUWKHGLVEXUVHPHQWVDUHRIWHQURXWHGWKURXJKORFDOFRXQFLOORU¶VRIILFH
which is inherently inefficient ± making the entire scheme highly discretionary and prone to 
corruption and creating the scope for additional delay and undue discrimination. A better scheme 
may be envisaged through direct cash transfer mechanism by involving self-certification and 
bypassing the office local representatives. The monetary deprivation of the female-headed 
households may perhaps be tackled through better financial assistance schemes, but to improve 
upon their non-monetary deprivation calls for a more holistic approach. 
Third, we draw attention to legal factors related to tenancy and slum notification. In Kolkata and 
Mumbai, we observe that the households in tenements settlements are consistently non-monetarily 
worse off than those who own their houses. The former continues to remain in a backward state 
largely due to obsolete land tenure arrangements, institutionalized neglect and discrimination. 
Adding to their woes, many tenement settlements in Mumbai and Kolkata are recently facing a 
VWDWXVTXRXQGHUGLIIHUHQWWHQDQF\DFWVDQGDUHDOVRXQGHUµUHQWFRQWURO¶RZLQJWRSURSHUW\ULJKWV
disputes). These distresses call for new laws to confer some property rights to those living in 
tenement settlements. We further observe in Mumbai that the households in the slums that are 
protected from eviction are non-monetarily no different than those in unrecognized slums. This 
observation contests the UN¶V notion of improving living standards through tenure security. In 
India, the Rajiv Awas Yojna (RAY) scheme for assisting the poor households in urban slums to 
construct or renovate their houses is in existence for a decade now. This scheme however can be 
availed only by those with legal ownership status over their dwelling plots, but Indian slum Acts 
do not confer the ownership right to the slum habitants. Modernization of slum acts in India by 
conferring legally recognized foothold (through land titling) of the slum-dwellers may bring 
stability in their life ± securing both their pecuniary and non-pecuniary prosperity.  
Finally, there are a number of available national and state government schemes for dealing with 
monetary and non-monetary deprivations.49 While the potential accessibility of these schemes 
depends on the identification strategies for targeting beneficiaries, their tangibility depends on the 
efficient implementation and on the quantum of pecuniary emoluments and profound legal 
entitlements. For example, restricting various schemes ± such as, Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojna 
                                                 
49
 9DULRXVVWDWHDQGFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWV¶VFKHPHVDUHDYDLODEOHDWWKHIROORZLQJVRXUFHVDFFHVVHGLQ6HSWHPEHU
http://www.wbdma.gov.in/HTM/MUNI_AtaGlance.htm (tab: programmes) 
http://www.mhupa.gov.in/User_Panel/UserView.aspx?TypeID=1405  
http://performance.gov.in/?q=flagship-programmes  
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(PMUY) for LPG connections and Rashtriya Swasth Bima Yojna (RSBY) for family health 
insurance, merely to below-the-poverty-line (BPL) households would exclude many other 
potential beneficiaries in slums, especially when the BPL identification methodologies have been 
criticized, debated and amended so many times in the last two decades (Alkire and Seth, 2013a,b). 
There is thus serious need for reevaluating and broadening the implementability of the available 
programs in order to improve the living conditions in slums.  
Our approach in this paper may be replicated for slums in other countries and regions for 
understanding the specific characteristics of these slums for designing better policies to improve 
the living conditions of slum-dwellers in UN-SDG framework. Even in order to understand the 
efficacy of various public policies, it is important that the living conditions are not only assessed 
by monetary indicators but also through a non-monetary approach capturing the joint distribution 
of achievements in different indicators. We strongly hope our study would stimulate serious 
academic interest and contribute to the relevant public policy debates. 
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Appendix A: List of sampled slums in Kolkata, Delhi and Mumbai 
Kolkata 
Borough  
No. Slum Name 
1 Chiria More, Dumdum Road 
  Churipara, Ghosh Bagan 
  Seth Pukur Road 
2 27, Munshi Para Lane, Canal West Road 
  93\1a, 440, Masjid Bari Street, Hatibagan 
  Krishna Ram Bose Street 
3 1 No Dr. Panchanan Mitra Lane, Narkeldanga 
  1-6, 67-71, Surah 2nd Lane, Narkeldanga 
  15\H\6\1  8\A, 8\C 7\7  Chamru Singh Lane 
  89,93,94,95,97,98,99,100   Narkeldanga 
4 1, Ramesh Dutta Street, Rabindra Sarani 
  2,3a, 3b, 3c, 3d Gas Street 
  2b, Brojo Kumar (B.K.) Seth Street 
5 1 No Srinath Babu Lane 
  3 & 12 Gour Dey Lane 
  3,3\1,3\4,15,16,14, Beliaghata Rd 
6 1-4, Chhatu Babu Lane 
  14 Elliot Rd, Ripon Street 
  14, Niyogi Pukur Lane 
  15 Convent Lane.  114-120 Ananda Palit Rd. 
  29\2, 51\1, Doctor (Durga Charan) Lane 
  Islam St; 1-3,29,30,47 Phool Bagan Rd. 
7 1,2,5-14, Tiljala Road 
  12\4\7,12\4, Gobind Khatick Raod 
  13, Mahendra Chatterjee Road 
  13-14, Paymental Garden Lane 
  15-16, Gobra Road 
  17,19, 21, 105, Beck Bagan Rd. 
  17, New Tangra Road 
  2, New Tangra Road 
  28-30, Christopher Road 
  4-9, Ram Mohan Bera Lane 
  41, Pulin Khatik Road 
  6-16, Guri Para 
  Muslim Camp, 69 D.C. Dey Road 
  Swinhoe Lane 
8 19, Ashutosh Mukherjee Road 
  39, Beltala Road. Pyara Bagan Basti 
  Kali Lane 
9 16, Ibrahim Road 
  Bhut Ghat 
  Jayananda Mistri Lane 
10 Chetla Rd., Mandal's Temple 
  Dr. Deodar Rahman Road 
  Kumor Para Bustee 
11 Atabagan, Sheikh Para 
  H.L. Sarkar Road 
  Pratapgarh Manashatala 
12 EM Bypass, Purba Rajdanga 
  Safui Road, Naskar Para 
  Shahid Smriti Colony 
  Uttar Purba Panchanna Gram 
13 Agarwal Garden Road, Behala 
  Manjhi Para Road, Behala 
  Motilal Gupta Road, Behala 
 14 33, Pathak Para Road 
  Dr.A.K. Paul Road 
  Ram Narayan Mukherjee Rd 
 15 Fatehpur Village Road 
  Gazipara, Akra Road 
  Paharpur Road I 
  Paharpur Road Ii 
  Panch Para Basti 
Delhi 
Revenue 
District Slum Name 
Central Ambedkar Basti 
  Dhobi Ghat, Press Road 
  LNJP Hospital 
  Malikpur 
  Shakoor Ki Dandi 
East Indira Camp Trilok Puri 
  Pandit Bismil Camp 
  Ravidas Camp 
North East CPJ Block, New Seelam Pur 
  Imbira Pushtha Basti 
New Delhi Indira Gandhi Camp 
  Saraswati Camp RK Puram 
  Sewa Camp Vasant Vihar 
  Shaheed Arjun Das Camp 
  Shri Ram JJC 
North Block- EE, Ring Bund Huts 
  CD Block- Sabzi Mandi 
  Ekta Camp 
  Hanuman Mandir, Model Town 
  Kabir Nagar 
  Samaypur Badli 
  Sanjay Sudhar Samiti Camp 
North West Chandra Shekhar Azad Colony 
  Dhobi Ghat, Y Block, Mangolpuri 
  Kanhaiya Nagar Crossing 
  Meera Bagh 
  Shakti Nagar Extension 
South East Bhoomiheen Camp Kalkaji 
  Harijan Camp, Lodhi Road 
  Pratap Camp 
  Sanjay Colony Tilak Bridge 
Shahdara Deepak Colony Dilshad Garden 
  Kalender Colony 
  Rajiv Gandhi Camp 
  Sundar Nagari 
  Sunder Nagri 
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South Grah Kalyan Samiti 
  Harijan Camp and Banjara Camp 
  JJC in Front Of B4/B5, Vasant Kunj 
  Jeewan Jyoti Rajeev Camp 
  Kusumpur Pahari 
  Mini Subhash Camp 
  Motilal Nehru Camp Jnu 
  Sanjay Colony, Okhla 
South West Behind Police Station Vasant Kunj 
  East Sagarpur, Nallapar 
  Sonia Gandhi Camp 
West 5/35 Industrial Area Kirti Nagar 
  Chara Mandi Jhakira Flyover 
  Harijan Basti, Chuna Bhatti 
  Jagannath Camp 
  Mayapuri Railway Line 
  Natraj Cinema, Sudama Puri 
  Peeli Kothi,Hari Nagar 
  Raghubir Nagar 
  Sanjay Camp, Chuna Bhatti 
Mumbai 
Ward  
Name Slum Name 
 A Dhobi Ghat 
  Dr. Babasahed Ambedkar Nagar 
 B Bibijan Street 
 D Banganga 
  Shivaji Nagar, Malabar Hills 
 E Nava Nagar 
  Patra Chawl 
 FN Dinbandhu Nagar 
  Ganesh Nagar 
  Sangam Nagar 
  Sion Koliwada (+Sra) 
 FS Shivdi Cross Road 
 GN Janta Naya Nagar 
  Kashinath Dhrurubhai Patra Chawl 
  Kumbharwadi 
  Palwadi (+Sra) 
 GS Mahatma Phule Nagar, Ward G/S 
  Rajiv Gandhi Transit Campus 
 HE Behram Pada 
  Jaku Club Santacruz 
  Jawahar Nagar, Ward H/E 
  Shastri Nagar, Santacruze 
  Valmiki Nagar 
 HW Navjeevan Society 
  Sidhivinayak Chawl 
 KE Ambewadi 
  Malapa Dongri-2 
  Railwayline Service Road 
  Shiv Tekdi 
 KW Gaon Devi Dongri (+Sra) 
  Gilbert Hill 
  Jeevan Nagar 
  Umar Bhai Chawl, Behrambagh (+Sra) 
 L Ambedkar Nagar, Ward-L 
  Mahatma Phule Nagar, Ward L 
  Nehru Nagar Kurla 
  Shivaji Kutir Jhoparpatti 
  Vasant Nagar 
  Vinoba  Bhave Nagar 
 ME Borla Kamawadi Zopadpatti 
  Indira Nagar 
  Kamala Raman Nagar 
  Nirankari Nagar 
  Raman Mama Nagar 
  Shivaji Nagar, Chembur 
 MW Ayodhaya Nagar 
  Bhai Bhai Nagar 
  Chhatrapati Shivaji Nagar 
 N Hanuman Nagar 
  Pant Nagar Ghatkopar (East) 
  Pitamaha Ramji Nagar 
  Siddharth Nagar 
 PN Irani Wadi (+Sra) 
  Makrani Pada 
  Nivedita Compound 
  Pathan Wadi 
  Shivaji Nagar-Malad 
  Valni Jhopadpatti 
 PS Govind Nagar 
  Jawahar Nagar, Ward P/S 
  Sundar Nagar 
 RC Holy Cross Road 
  Kasturba Road, 8/9 Kaheri 
 RN Ketaki Pada 
  Maratha Colony 
 RS Ganesh Nagar Govt. 
  Ganesh Nagar Kandivali 
  Ganesh Nagar Pvt. 
  Ratna Bai Chawl 
 S Ambedkar Nagar, S-Ward 
  Anand Nagar 
  Kamble Compound 
  Sambhaji Nagar 
  Shah Colony 
  Shree Datta Mandir 
 T Gavan Pada 
  Ghati Pada 
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Appendix B: Pairwise association between indicators in Kolkata, Delhi and Mumbai 
The following table reports the percentage of slum dwellers deprived in each indicator as well as 
the percentage of slum dwellers that are deprived in every pair of indicators simultaneously, 
reflecting the pair-ZLVHDVVRFLDWLRQEHWZHHQLQGLFDWRUV¶GHSULYDWLRQV 
Kolkata 
Ind   Wa Sn Ho Le Ov Co He Sv At Ce 
  Depr 21.2% 82.4% 74.5% 62.6% 65.0% 26.8% 42.8% 19.4% 60.7% 83.0% 
 
 Percentage of slum dwellers simultaneously deprived in row and column indicators  
Sn 82.4% 16.4%                   
Ho 74.5% 16.7% 65.6%                 
Le 62.6% 16.4% 55.0% 53.9%               
Oc 65.0% 12.8% 59.0% 50.4% 42.9%             
Co 26.8% 7.3% 23.9% 20.4% 19.6% 19.4%           
He 42.8% 7.6% 37.9% 31.6% 28.9% 28.5% 13.5%         
Sv 19.4% 4.2% 17.8% 14.2% 13.4% 15.0% 8.2% 9.0%       
At 60.7% 14.4% 53.1% 48.3% 41.2% 42.0% 20.1% 25.8% 14.4%     
Ce 83.0% 18.0% 70.2% 61.8% 55.2% 56.5% 24.7% 39.4% 17.0% 53.1%   
Ed 41.7% 9.7% 37.1% 32.4% 28.4% 29.0% 14.3% 18.0% 11.0% 28.2% 36.2% 
Delhi 
Ind   Wa Sn Ho Le Ov Co He Sv At Ce 
  Depr 29.7% 80.3% 52.6% 67.1% 64.9% 39.0% 24.3% 15.6% 44.3% 88.6% 
  Percentage of slum dwellers simultaneously deprived in row and column indicators 
Sn 80.3% 25.2%                   
Ho 52.6% 15.7% 45.1%                 
Le 67.1% 20.5% 57.4% 40.6%               
Oc 64.9% 18.1% 52.5% 36.9% 46.0%             
Co 39.0% 11.8% 34.2% 24.9% 29.3% 27.9%           
He 24.3% 7.4% 19.2% 13.8% 17.5% 15.2% 9.3%         
Sv 15.6% 3.9% 13.1% 9.7% 11.8% 11.0% 7.3% 3.5%       
At 44.3% 13.0% 40.0% 25.3% 31.1% 30.1% 22.4% 11.5% 8.9%     
Ce 88.6% 26.4% 72.0% 46.9% 60.7% 59.0% 36.2% 22.6% 14.2% 39.3%   
Ed 43.4% 12.8% 35.2% 24.1% 30.8% 30.5% 21.0% 11.1% 9.4% 23.8% 38.8% 
Mumbai 
 Ind   Wa Sn Ho Le Ov Co He Sv At Ce 
  Depr 10.6% 84.4% 52.6% 51.9% 63.2% 19.7% 24.8% 15.7% 34.5% 64.6% 
 
 Percentage of slum dwellers simultaneously deprived in row and column indicators 
Sn 84.4% 9.6%                   
Ho 52.6% 7.6% 46.7%                 
Le 51.9% 6.2% 45.2% 30.0%               
Oc 63.2% 7.7% 54.8% 34.4% 34.1%             
Co 19.7% 3.0% 17.5% 13.6% 11.6% 12.8%           
He 24.8% 3.8% 21.4% 12.4% 16.4% 15.3% 5.9%         
Sv 15.7% 2.8% 13.8% 9.3% 10.0% 11.3% 5.4% 5.4%       
At 34.5% 5.3% 31.9% 21.5% 20.0% 24.3% 9.7% 9.2% 8.7%     
Ce 64.6% 7.5% 57.1% 34.9% 35.6% 44.9% 14.0% 19.1% 11.5% 25.8%   
Ed 17.2% 3.6% 15.9% 11.0% 10.4% 11.5% 5.2% 5.1% 5.0% 10.6% 12.4% 
Ind: Indicator; Depr: Percentage of population deprived in each indicator; Wa: Water Facility; Sn: Sanitation Facility; 
Ho: Type of house; Le: Leakage in house; Ov: Over-crowding; Re: Respiratory health risk; He: Health insurance; Sv: 
Savings instrument; At: Asset ownership; Ce: Information instrument; Ed: Education attainment. 
 
